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V. FEDERAL TORT CLAIMs ACT
A. Discretionary Function Exception
The Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA)' authorizes ac-
tions against the United States for damages resulting from
injury to or loss of property, or personal injury or death
caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of
any federal government employee acting within the scope
of her employment under circumstances "where the
United States, if a private person, would be liable to the
claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the
act or omission occurred."' 2 The FTCA does not apply,
however, to any claims based upon an act or omission of a
governmental employee exercising due care in perform-
ing or failing to perform a discretionary function or duty
authorized under a federal statute or regulation, whether
1 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680 (1988).
2 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1988). The statute, however, specifically precludes liability
"for interest prior to judgement or for punitive damages." Id.
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or not the discretion has been abused.3
In Leone v. United States,4 the plaintiffs brought an action
against the United States under the FTCA, alleging that
aviation medical examiners, acting as government em-
ployees, were negligent in examining a pilot for evidence
of heart disease prior to the pilot obtaining his FAA certi-
fication. The plaintiffs' decedents died in an aircraft crash
when the pilot apparently suffered a heart attack and lost
control of the craft. According to the plaintiffs, the physi-
cians failed to adequately question the pilot about his
medical history and failed to sufficiently examine him for
clinical evidence of angina or coronary heart disease. As a
result, the pilot received certification in violation of fed-
eral regulations specifying that no applicant with an estab-
lished medical history or clinical diagnosis of myocardial
infarction, angina pectoris, or coronary heart disease
could receive a satisfactory medical certificate. 5
The government's primary argument for dismissal of
the action was based on its interpretation of a recent
United States Supreme Court case.6 The government
contended that the Supreme Court had made it clear that
the discretionary function exception to the FTCA ex-
tended to all activities undertaken pursuant to regulatory
authority. The Leone court determined, however, that the
Supreme Court decision involved federal regulations em-
powering government employees to make policy judg-
ments when conducting airline inspection compliance
reviews and that such power was discretionary. The court
did not believe that the Supreme Court decision could be
construed so broadly as to bring all regulatory activities
-5 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1988). The provisions of the FTCA do not apply to
"[any claim... based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise
or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency or an
employee of the government, whether or not the discretion involved be abused."
28 U.S.C. § 2680(a).
* 690 F. Supp. 1182 (E.D.N.Y. 1988).
See 14 C.F.R. § 67.17 (1990).
, United States v. S.A. Empresa De Viacao Aerea Rio Grandesnse, 467 U.S. 797
(1984).
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under the discretionary powers exception.7 The court
concluded that the discretionary function exception was
inapplicable to the government's alleged failure to apply
clearly articulated, undeviating medical standards in the
context of a physical examination. Therefore, the plain-
tiffs were entitled to maintain an action against the United
States under the FTCA.8
On the basis of the discretionary function exception,
the federal district court in Pepper v. United States9 dis-
missed an action brought under the FTCA for lack of sub-
ject matter jurisdiction. The plaintiffs represented the
estates of a pilot and a co-pilot, who were killed when
their aircraft lost power during take-off and struck trees
located near the departure end of an airport runway. The
plaintiffs claimed that the trees were an "obstruction" to
air navigation in violation of federal regulations.' 0 They
alleged that the defendant, acting through the Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA), breached its duty to
"eliminate" the obstruction and that the breach proxi-
mately caused the decedents' death.
The court examined the applicable statutes and regula-
tions and held that the regulations pertaining to objects
affecting navigable airspace did not require the FAA to
remove obstructions." The court noted that the statutory
language suggested discretionary rather than mandatory
requirements, and general policy standards rather than
specific discretion. The court, therefore, concluded that
the FAA had discretion in the manner in which it dealt
with obstructions at the airport. Assuming the FAA took
no steps to exercise the discretion, the court reasoned
that it had no power to hear the plaintiffs' claim.' 2 The
court did find that the FAA could be held liable for negli-
Leone, 690 F. Supp. at 1187.
I ld. at 1188.
9 21 Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,775 (W.D. Mich. 1988).
10 Id.; see 49 U.S.C. app. §§ 1348(a), 1502 (1988); 14 C.F.R. §§ 77.21, 77.23
(1990).
II Pepper, 21 Av. Cas. (CCH) at 17,776.
12 Id.
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gently attempting to remedy an obstruction of the run-
way's approach slope by creating a displaced threshold,
constructively moving the physical end of the runway to a
point further away from the trees. However, the court
found no evidence to suggest that the FAA negligently
created, maintained, publicized, or operated the runway's
displaced threshold. 3
In Fleming v. United States,' 4 a pilot and copilot brought
an action seeking damages from the federal government
under the FTCA, for injuries sustained when their aircraft
crashed while attempting to land with the aid of a Non-
Directional Beacon (NDB), a government-operated navi-
gational aid. The plaintiffs alleged that the NDB had been
improperly placed for use as a separate navigational de-
vice. They further contended that their use of the NDB
was necessary because the airport's Instrument Landing
System (ILS) facility was not operating at the time of the
crash. The government argued that its previous acquisi-
tion of the existing NDB as a federal navigational facility
was a discretionary act protected by the discretionary
function exception to the FTCA.' 5
The court relying on Berkovitz v. United States,' 6 con-
cluded that governmental conduct which engendered reli-
ance did not in and of itself create an actionable claim
under the FTCA. Rather, the claimant was required to
show that the challenged conduct did not involve an ele-
ment of judgment or choice, or that the judgment or
choice did not concern an area intended to be protected
from liability. 7 The Fleming court determined that the
government's conduct arguably involved settled policy
matters, including the cost of moving the NDB to a loca-
tion consistent with its use as a separate navigational facil-
ity, the temporary nature of such a move, the cost
1" Id.
14 21 Av. Cas. (CCH) 18,335 (W.D. Pa. 1989).
- Id. at 18,336.
- 486 U.S. 531 (1988).
17 Fleming, 21 Av. Cas. (CCH) at 18,338.
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incurred in returning the NDB to its original location
once the airport's ILS facility was returned to service, and
the availability of manpower and property upon which the
NDB could be temporarily located. Since the airport
would have been closed to all instrument landings without
the NDB or ILS facilities, air safety also was a
consideration.
The court held that the discretionary function excep-
tion did not apply if the FAA was required to operate the
NDB when the airport's ILS was out of service in accord-
ance with a federal statute, regulation, or policy specifi-
cally prescribing such a course of action. Since it was
unknown whether the government had a choice in operat-
ing the NDB at the time of the crash, the government's
motion for summaryjudgment was denied on the issue of
the applicability of the discretionary function exception.'"
The court, however, did grant partial summary judgment
in favor of the government with regard to the plaintiffs'
assertion that a cause of action existed under the FTCA
merely because the government's conduct engendered re-
liance and actually subjected them to a more dangerous
condition. '9
In Charlima, Inc. v. United States,20 the plaintiff filed suit
against the FAA alleging negligence when a designated
representative, authorized to make airworthiness inspec-
tions under federal regulation, 2' failed to discover an air-
craft's damaged wing spars. The airworthiness inspector
approved the craft, and the FAA issued a certificate of air-
worthiness. The certificate was revoked when the plaintiff
discovered the damaged wing spars.
The plaintiff alleged that the inspector was a federal
employee and was negligent in failing to discover the
damaged wing spar. The district court granted the de-
fendant's motion for summary judgment, holding that the
i" Id. at 18,339.
19 Id.
2o 873 F.2d 1078 (8th Cir. 1989).
2 See 14 C.F.R. § 183.33 (1990).
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United States was immune from tort liability under the
discretionary function exception to the FTCA.22 The
plaintiff appealed, contending that the government was li-
able under the FTCA, that the discretionary function ex-
ception was inapplicable, and that the airworthiness
inspector was a federal employee.
Under the FTCA the conduct of a representative can
subject the federal government to liability only if the rep-
resentative is classified as a federal employee. The cru-
cial element in determining whether an individual may be
considered a federal employee is the amount of control
the federal government has over the individual's perform-
ance. 23 The court of appeals in Charlima concluded that
the designated airworthiness inspector was not an em-
ployee of the FAA since the FAA did not control his day-
to-day activities.2 4 Although the FAA acted generally as
an overseer, it did not manage the details of the inspec-
tor's work or supervise him in his daily investigative du-
ties. In addition, the FAA had no customary contractual
relationship with the inspector, nor was he on the FAA
payroll or otherwise compensated by the FAA. Instead,
the inspector was paid by the airworthiness certificate ap-
plicant, who elected to use him to inspect its aircraft at its
own cost instead of allowing FAA personnel to conduct
the inspection.
The court also held that the mere promulgation of FAA
regulations governing the inspection process did not
bring a designated aircraft inspector under the scope of
federal employment.25 The court noted that if the United
States were liable for the acts of designated representa-
tives, every governmental attempt to enhance the safety of
the workplace or a transportation system could lead to
22 Charlima, 873 F.2d at 1080. "A Designated Airworthiness Representative
(DAR) may .... (2)(a) Perform examination, inspection, and testing services nec-
essary to the issuance of certificates ... in the area of maintenance, or ... in the
area of manufacturing and engineering." Id.
" United States v. Orleans, 425 U.S. 807, 814 (1976).
24 Charlima, 873 F.2d at 1081-82.
w, Id. at 1081.
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governmental tort liability, and the effect "would be to
make the Government ajoint insurer of all activity subject
to safety inspection. ' 26 Since the designated representa-
tive was not a federal employee, the court found it unnec-
essary to address the issue of whether the federal
government was immune from liability under the discre-
tionary function exception.
B. Federal Pre-emption
In In re Air Crash Disaster at Stapleton International Airport,
Denver, Colorado, November 15, 1987,27 Continental Airlines
(Continental) moved for summary judgment or dismissal
of the plaintiffs' punitive damage claims on the grounds
that: (1) federal regulation of interstate air traffic and
commercial air carriers pre-empted state regulation of air-
craft safety through tort claims for punitive damages; and
(2) compliance with federal regulations prevented a find-
ing of liability under state punitive damage statutes as a
matter of law.28
The district court concluded that federal law did not
pre-empt the state law claims for punitive damages. Rely-
ing on the holding of Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp. ,29 the
court found that even when federal statutes, regulations,
and agencies closely regulate conduct in interstate com-
merce, "punitive damages have long been a part of tradi-
tional state tort law," preserved by a savings clause
included in the federal statute.30 Here, the savings clause
of the Federal Aviation Act stated, that "nothing con-
tained in this Act shall in any way abridge or alter the rem-
edies now existing at common law or by statute, but the
provisions of this Act are in addition to such remedies." 3'
The court further held that the presumption against
6 Id. at 1082 (quoting Garbarino v. United States, 666 F.2d 1061, 1066 (6th
Cir. 1981)).
27 721 F. Supp. 1185 (D. Co. 1988).
8 Id. at 1186.
2t, 464 U.S. 238 (1984).
Air Crash at Denver, 721 F. Supp. at 1187 (quoting Silkwood, 464 U.S. at 255).
49 U.S.C. app. § 1506 (1988).
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pre-emption, which normally attached to traditional state
regulation of health and safety, could only be defeated by
clear indications in the statute or legislative history that
Congress specifically intended to limit state tort liability
to actions for compensatory damages. The court con-
cluded that various provisions of the Federal Aviation Act
did not overcome that presumption and, consequently,
federal law did not pre-empt state law claims for punitive
damages.32
C. Constitutional Challenges
Lake v. Lake County, Montana33 was an eminent domain
proceeding brought by the City of Ronan (Ronan) to con-
demn the plaintiffs' property for an airport expansion
project. The plaintiffs responded by seeking a prelimi-
nary injunction to halt the city's sanction, a summary
judgment motion, and a delay of the proceedings. The
plaintiffs also sought a preliminary injunction against
Lake County to prohibit funding of the city's activities.
The District Court of Lake County denied the plaintiffs'
motion and quashed the motion for preliminary injunc-
tion against the county.34 The plaintiffs appealed to the
Montana Supreme Court.
The Montana Supreme Court held that a joint agree-
ment, entered into pursuant to state statute, by a city and
others, for the purpose of developing a regional airport,
did not prohibit the city from independently exercising its
power of eminent domain. Even though the statute re-
quired joint action when an eminent domain proceeding
was brought under the authority of the joint airport
board, the statute did not, on its face, preclude action sep-
arate and apart from that taken by the joint airport board.
In addition, the Montana Constitution endowed cities
with a broad grant of powers. The court concluded that
to limit the statutory scheme to a narrow interpretation
32 Air Crash at Denver, 721 F. Supp. at 1188.
3. 233 Mont. 126, 759 P.2d 161 (1988).
. Id., 759 P.2d at 162.
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restricting the city's power of eminent domain would con-
travene both constitutional and legislative requirements.3 5
The court further held that the constitutional right to
due process guaranteed that no person would be deprived
of property in an eminent domain proceeding without ad-
equate notice, hearing, and just compensation. 6 The
plaintiffs argued that it was unfair to allow the city to
bring an independent eminent domain proceeding and
thereby manipulate the geographical area subject to pub-
lic necessity determination. The court concluded, how-
ever, that the plaintiffs were unable to cite authority
supporting their contention, and that the city's compli-
ance with the state statutory eminent domain procedures
clearly satisfied the due process requirements.3 7
D. Negligence
In Beattie v. United States,3s the district court found that
U.S. Navy air traffic controllers stationed in Antarctica
were not negligent in causing or contributing to the crash
of a passenger aircraft into a mountain. The court deter-
mined that the careless attitude of the airline in changing
flight plans without thoroughly briefing the flight crew
about the switch and its implications, resulting in the air-
craft straying twenty-six miles off course and several thou-
sand feet too low, caused the crash. The crew did not
avail itself of several fail-safe systems, any one of which
would have enabled it to discover in ample time that the
aircraft was not on a proper course and would have per-
mitted the crew to alter the improper course without sig-
nificant difficulty. Since the air traffic controllers had no
reason to suspect that the errors had occurred and that a
dangerous condition existed, and since the flight crew was
in a better position than the controller to appreciate the
danger, the court determined that the controllers had no
35 Id., 759 P.2d at 165.
-6 Id. (relying on Housing Auth. v. Bjork, 109 Mont. 552, 98 P.2d 324 (1940)).
37 Id., 759 P.2d at 166.
-I 690 F. Supp. 1068 (D.D.C. 1988).
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basis for suspecting the flight was in danger or peril, or
for redirecting the flight or taking extraordinary measures
that the flight crew never requested them to take.
The plaintiffs' principal claim was that the air traffic
controllers offered radar guidance to the aircraft but
breached a duty to provide such guidance after the crew
of the aircraft had accepted it. The court found no formal
undertaking, under which the Navy would have owed a
duty to the plaintiffs' decedents. The court also found
that the Navy had not breached an informal duty to
render services, either gratuitously or for a consideration.
The court concluded that no legal duty ran from the Navy
to the civilian aircraft to furnish air traffic control services
on a routine basis.40
If Navy personnel explicitly led the crew of a particular
flight to believe that certain services would be forthcom-
ing, such personnel would have a duty to exercise reason-
able care in rendering those services. The crew of an
aircraft, however, would not be justified in assuming that
radar guidance would be available unless and until they
were specifically advised by the air traffic controller that
radar contact had actually been established. The court
held that the evidence revealed that such advice was never
explicitly given to this particular flight crew and, further,
that establishment of radar contact could not have been
implicitly assumed by the crew.
Finally, the court held that the air traffic controllers
were not in a position to challenge or second guess the
pilot's representations regarding what he could see and
where he was going, particularly when the pilot informed
the controller that he could see where he was going. The
air traffic controllers could not have assumed that the
crew did not have the high terrain in sight. If the flight
crew believed that it could not proceed without radar
assistance, they had an obligation to go elsewhere, and
39 Id. at 1084.
40 Id. at 1073.
41 Id. at 1078.
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the air traffic controllers could not be faulted for failing to
anticipate that the crew would proceed anyway and that it
would do so at an altitude which would inevitably lead to a
crash.42
In Nicholson Air Services, Inc. v. United States,43 the plaintiff
brought an action under the FTCA, arising from an air-
craft crash on approach to Westmoreland County Airport
in Pennsylvania. The plaintiff alleged that the United
States was liable because an FAA navigational aid,
designed to provide information to aircraft approaching
the airport, was faulty.
The United States Fire Insurance Company, which pro-
vided hull insurance on the aircraft, filed an administra-
tive claim with the FAA. After the claim was denied, the
plaintiff brought suit against the United States in the fed-
eral district court. The government moved to dismiss,
claiming that since a person other than the person who
filed the administrative claim instituted the suit, the court
lacked subject matter jurisdiction. The plaintiff con-
tended that the insurance company should be added or
substituted as a plaintiff under Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure 15(a) and 17(a). The court denied the govern-
ment's motion to dismiss, relying upon Executive Jet
Aviation, Inc. v. United States,44 in which the Sixth Circuit
held that "the filing of an administrative claim by an in-
sured tolled the filing of the statute of limitations with re-
spect to a claim filed by an insurer." In Executive Jet
Aviation, the insured was allowed to amend its administra-
tive complaint to show the insurer as a joint claimant and,
to join the insurer as a plaintiff in the lawsuit.45
The Nicholson court found no substantive difference be-
tween the insurer's assertions in the administrative claim
before the FAA and the claim which was asserted in the
plaintiff's suit, since both were for the same amount and
42 Id. at 1079.
4s 686 F. Supp. 538 (D. Md. 1988).
4 507 F.2d 508 (6th Cir. 1974).
45 Id. at 515.
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arose out of the same facts. As a result, the court permit-
ted the insurer to be substituted for the owner as a plain-
tiff in the suit pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.4 6
In Hayes v. Gates Learijet Corp. ,47 the district court found
an FAA examiner negligent for passing a pilot in a flight
certification test after the applicant failed to successfully
execute an emergency maneuver during takeoff. The ex-
aminer was also found negligent in providing instructions
between the first and second attempt to execute the ma-
neuver and in allowing the applicant a second chance to
perform the maneuver. The first and third acts of negli-
gence were each found to be a proximate cause of the air-
craft's crash. In addition, the court found the safety pilot
negligent in failing to fulfill his duty to take control of the
aircraft and that such negligence was also a proximate
cause of the crash. The United States was liable, under
the FTCA, to the safety pilot, who suffered serious and
permanent brain injuries, and to his wife, as a result of the
FAA examiner's negligence.4
In In re Air Crash at Dallas/Fort Worth Airport, August 2,
1985,' 9 the plaintiffs brought a wrongful death action aris-
ing out of an air crash in which 137 persons were killed.
Delta Airlines was joined as a plaintiff against the United
States, the FAA, and the National Weather Service, in or-
der to establish liability and to recoup damages under the
FTCA. The court found in favor of the federal govern-
ment, ruling that the plaintiffs had failed to prove that the
government was guilty of any negligence proximately
causing the crash. The court held, instead, that the crew's
attempt to land the aircraft in a thunderstorm and its fail-
ure to execute a missed approach constituted negligence
and were the proximate causes of the crash.50
4, Nicholson Air, 686 F. Supp. at 538-39.
47 21 Av. Cas. (CCH) 18,115 (W.D. Tex. 1988).
49 Id. at 18,121.
4, 720 F. Supp. 1258 (N.D. Tex. 1989).
5o Id. at 1280-85.
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The court recognized that both through their own ob-
servation and from communications received during their
descent and approach to the airport, the crew had suffi-
cient information to assess the developing weather situa-
tion along the final approach to the runway and to make a
proper decision either to continue the approach or to take
alternate action. The crew was aware of variable winds
and rain showers of sufficient intensity to obscure forward
vision. At no time during the final approach did it request
additional information on weather conditions from any
one of the available sources. The court determined that
the crew's failure to solicit additional weather information
was evidence of an unreasonable disregard for the risk of
landing in unstable weather.5 ' The court found the crew
undertook an unreasonable risk by continuing the ap-
proach in a thunderstorm. The wind shear and the poten-
tial for a microburst should have prompted the crew to
take immediate action to execute a missed approach.
The court found, however, that the government air traf-
fic controllers breached a duty by failing to inform incom-
ing aircraft of the existence of extreme and hazardous
weather north of the airport, and that the controllers were
not justified in assuming that the weather was observable
by the crew. Nevertheless, the court-held that the breach
was inconsequential to the fate of the aircraft. There was
no evidence that the crew would have acted differently
with confirmation of information already known.52 The
court also found that the air traffic controller was not neg-
ligent in failing to change runways prior to the crash be-
cause the pilot had the responsibility to decide, and was
the final authority on, which runway would be used for
landing.53
In Schuler v. United States,5 4 the estates of a pilot and a
passenger brought wrongful death actions under the
Id. at 1281-82.
Id. at 1289-90.
.' Id. at 1290.
.4 675 F. Supp. 1088 (W.D. Mich. 1987), rev'd 868 F.2d 195 (6th Cir. 1989).
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FTCA against the federal government, alleging negli-
gence on the part of the FAA's air traffic controllers. The
pilot radioed air traffic control at the airport that he had
lost an engine and was returning to the airport. He re-
quested landing on Runway 32, and the controller gave
him visual approach clearance to land. An Air Force C-
130, however, was obstructing the reciprocal end of Run-
way 32. The pilot requested runway clearance, and two
seconds later the controller told the C-130 to exit the ex-
tension of Runway 32. On approach, the pilot banked
steeply to the side of the inoperable engine. The aircraft
stalled and plunged to the ground. Upon impact, the air-
craft burned, killing all passengers.
The district court assigned twenty percent of the re-
sponsibility for the crash to the United States. Specifi-
cally, the court found that the air traffic controller
breached his duty to keep the runway clear and to keep
the pilot informed about the C-130.55
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit reversed the district court,
holding that there was no duty of constant communica-
tion between the radar controller and the pilot during
clear weather conditions with regard to visible ground sit-
uations after an approach clearance and prior to issuing a
final landing clearance. 56 Although an air traffic control-
ler must exercise reasonable care, the court found that
"under visual flight rules conditions, the primary respon-
sibility for the safe operation of the aircraft rests with the
pilot, regardless of traffic clearance. ' 57
The court of appeals further concluded that the district
court erred in holding that the conduct of the air traffic
controller was a proximate cause of the accident. An air
traffic controller, the court noted, is not required to fore-
see or anticipate unlawful, negligent or grossly negligent
acts of pilots. Here, the court found that the controller
could not foresee that the pilot would place the aircraft
-'s Schuler, 675 F. Supp. at 1099.
.6 Shuler v. United States, 868 F.2d 195 (6th Cir. 1989).
.7 Id. at 197 (quoting Coatney v. Berkshire, 500 F.2d 290, 292 (8th Cir. 1974)).
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too close to the airport, at an excessive rate of speed, as
he returned to land. The pilot exercised his own judg-
ment and banked into the dead engine, causing the stall
and resulting crash. The appellate court reversed the dis-
trict court's decision and remanded the case for dismissal
of the complaint against the federal government.58
E. Governmental Contractor Defense
Courts have long recognized a special relationship be-
tween a government contractor and the federal govern-
ment which shields manufacturers supplying products to
the government from tort liability for flaws in product de-
sign.59 In Boyle v. United Technologies Corp. ,6 the United
States Supreme Court addressed the issue of the broad
availability of the government contractor defense, recog-
nizing that in certain areas of "uniquely federal interest,"
state law would be preempted and, if necessary, replaced
by federal common law. Specifically, the Court found that
an area of uniquely federal interest was the government's
procurement of military hardware. 6' The Court pro-
pounded the basic elements of the government contractor
defense, grounding its contours in the discretionary func-
tion exception to the FTCA.
The Court determined that liability for design defects
in military equipment cannot be imposed "when (1) the
United States approved reasonably precise specifications;
(2) the equipment conformed to those specifications; and
(3) the supplier warned the United States about the dan-
gers in the use of equipment that were known to the sup-
plier but not to the United States."' 62 These conditions
58 Id. at 198-99.
.59 See, e.g., Yearsley v. W.A. Ross Constr. Co., 309 U.S. 18 (1940). The govern-
ment contractor defense derived from the concept of sovereign immunity. "If a
contracter's authority to carry out the project was validly conferred, that is, if what
was done was within the constitutional power of Congress, there is no liability on
the part of the contractor for executing its will." Id. at 20-21.
- 487 U.S. 500 (1988).
- Id. at 504-06.
62 Id. at 512.
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are intended to ensure that the manufacturer will be able
to rely on the government contractor defense only if the
government has participated in the design decision, and
the government is aware of a design problem but has
made no attempt to correct the defect. If the government
was not involved in the design, and defects are later de-
tected, the contractor will not be able to rely on the
defense.63
Prior to the Boyle decision, the jury in Harduvel v. General
Dynamics Corp. 64had found General Dynamics negligent in
its design and manufacture of an F-16 fighter aircraft
which had crashed, killing the pilot. The jury also found
General Dynamics negligent in its failure to warn of the
dangers of the aircraft, strictly liable for the design and
manufacturing defects, and strictly liable for failing to
provide adequate warnings. 5 On appeal to the Eleventh
Circuit, General Dynamics relied solely on the govern-
ment contractor defense even though the recent Boyle de-
cision was specifically aimed at defects in design.
Although the plaintiff claimed that the cause of the crash,
wire chafing in the electrical system, was a manufacturing
defect, General Dynamics contended it was a design
defect.66
The Eleventh Circuit agreed with General Dynamics
and concluded that the use of the government contractor
defense was appropriate under the circumstances. The
court reasoned that in determining whether an alleged
defect was one of design or manufacture, the focus should
be on the protection of the discretionary activity for which
the defense was intended. If the defect was inherent in
the government approved product or system, the defense
would be available.67 Specifically, the court found that the
United States Air Force had developed the F-16 project,
6s Id. at 513.
878 F.2d 1311 (11th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1479 (1990).
6, Id. at 1315.
-o Id. at 1317.
67 Id.
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participated in the design and production process, and
continually communicated with General Dynamics about
the project. In addition, the court found that General Dy-
namics had advised the Air Force about the chafing prob-
lem and its potentially serious consequences. The court
concluded that General Dynamics had satisfied all three
elements of the Boyle defense and reversed the judgment
of the district court.68
In Nicholson v. United Technologies Corp. ,69 the plaintiff and
four other technicians were repairing a helicopter's land-
ing gear, manufactured by United Technologies Corpora-
tion (United Technologies), when the landing gear
exploded. The plaintiff filed suit under the Connecticut
Products Liability Act 70 and claimed negligence, breach of
warranty, strict liability, and failure to warn. The plaintiff
alleged that the maintenance manual provided by United
Technologies failed to adequately warn technicians of the
danger involved in repairing and disassembling the nose
landing gear strut. United Technologies moved for sum-
mary judgment on various grounds, including the govern-
ment contractor defense for failure to warn.7'
In reviewing United Technologies' reliance on the gov-
ernment contractor defense, the district court applied the
three elements of the Boyle decision's test. Although rec-
ognizing that Boyle did not explicitly extend to failure to
warn of manufacturing defects, the court concluded that
when the government provided the product's specifica-
tions, the contractor could not be liable for safeguards
omitted from those specifications. The court extended its
reasoning to include the contents of the product's mainte-
nance manual for those situations in which the govern-
ment had prepared or dictated the information.72
The court required United Technologies to demon-
- Id. at 1322.
69 697 F. Supp. 598 (D. Conn. 1988).
7o Id. at 600.
7, Id. at 599-600.
72 Id. at 603.
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strate that it acted pursuant to and in conformity with
specifications established or provided by the government
concerning the contents of the maintenance manual and
that those specifications were "reasonably precise. '" 3 In
support of its motion, United Technologies provided evi-
dence that the manual was in conformity with government
specifications. Additional evidence showed that the gov-
ernment maintained control over the manual's contents
and made revisions without United Technologies'
knowledge.
Under the third requirement of the government con-
tractor defense, the court required United Technologies
to provide evidence that it had warned the United States
about the dangers, if any, in the use of the equipment that
were known to United Technologies but not to the United
States. United Technologies provided evidence that it
was aware of no hazard posed by the landing gear strut
when the maintenance manual was drafted, nor did it sub-
sequently become aware of any specific knowledge sup-
porting the existence of a hazard. The plaintiff failed to
produce any evidence that United Technologies knew or
should have known about the defect and thus should have
warned the government. The court held that United
Technologies satisfied all three requirements for use of
the government contractor defense and granted summary
judgment as to the plaintiff's failure to warn claims.
Although the plaintiff's claims were based on state tort
law, the court found that the state-imposed duty of care as
a basis for a contractor's liability directly conflicted with
the duty imposed by the government contract, thus satis-
fying the "uniquely federal interest" standard of Boyle."'
VI. INDEMNIFICATION
In State of Alaska v. Korean Airlines Co.,7' South Central
Air, Inc. (SCA) brought suit against Korean Air Lines
7, Id. at 604.
74 Id. at 605.
7 776 P.2d 315 (Alaska 1989).
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(KAL) for damages incurred when an SCA aircraft col-
lided with a KAL DC-10 cargo jet attempting to take off
from the wrong runway at Anchorage International Air-
port. KAL, in turn, brought a third-party claim against
the State of Alaska, alleging, among other claims, negli-
gence in the design and maintenance of the airport's run-
way. In its defense, the state relied on a provision in its
lease with KAL requiring KAL to indemnify, defend, and
hold harmless the state from all liability and losses result-
ing from any act or omission by KAL connected with
KAL's use of the airport. The trial court granted sum-
mary judgment to KAL on the indemnity issue, conclud-
ing that the indemnification clause extended only to
losses arising out of the terminal premises, and not to
taxiways and runways.76 The state appealed to the Alaska
Supreme Court.
The supreme court held that, although an indemnity
agreement generally did not violate public policy by in-
demnifying the indemnitee for its own negligence, a court
would not give effect to a contractual provision indemni-
fying the indemnitee's own negligence when the clause
tended to promote breach of a duty owed to the public at
large. 77 The court further held that, although the indem-
nity agreement did not totally destroy the state's incentive
to act with great care in fulfilling its duty to maintain the
airport for the public's constant access and use, the public
duty exception was applicable due to the general nature
of the indemnification provision.78
The court also concluded that since the airport pro-
vided a public service to both airlines and the traveling
public, it would be unfair to allow the airport to impose
liability-avoiding agreements on those it was intended to
serve, particularly when the airlines had no choice but to
accept such an agreement if they were to use the airport.
To require airport lessees to indemnify the state for its
76 Id. at 316.
77 Id. at 317.
78 Id. at 317-19.
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own negligence also would violate statutory provisions
ensuring the rights of the public to the rightful, equal, and
uniform use of the airport.79
VII. NEGLIGENCE
A. Liability of Aircraft Carriers
In Bidini v. American Trans-Air, Inc. ,80 an airline passen-
ger was injured when she tripped over debris while walk-
ing up the aisle of a grounded aircraft. Alleging that the
air carrier possessed either actual or constructive notice
of the dangerous condition of the cluttered aisle, the pas-
senger filed suit, claiming that the airline failed to fulfill its
duty to make the aisle safe. The defendant moved for
summary judgment on the grounds that the plaintiff failed
to establish a prima facie case of negligence by not specifi-
cally identifying what caused her to trip.
The district court denied the defendant's motion for
summary judgment, noting that the airline had construc-
tive knowledge of the general condition of the aisle and
that the evidence was sufficient to raise an inference of the
existence of a dangerous condition. The court noted that
when an owner or operator invites participation of the
public in its operation, it must necessarily recognize and
be ready to discharge a heightened duty of care arising
out of the dangers reasonably anticipated as a result of
that participation. 8 ' The court concluded that since the
accident took place on premises constantly supervised by
airline employees, the jury had the right to consider the
type of premises and heightened duty of care. 2
In Ricci v. American Airlines,83 an airline passenger
brought suit against an air carrier for physical and psycho-
logical injuries sustained in an in-flight scuffle. A fight
broke out between the plaintiff, a smoker seated in the air-
Th Id. at 318-19.
so 21 Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,784 (E.D.N.Y. 1988).
I, d. at 17,786.
82 Id.
.3 21 Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,842 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1988).
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craft's smoking section, and a nonsmoking passenger
seated next to the plaintiff. The nonsmoking passenger
was assigned to the smoking section as result of the air-
line's overbooking of the flight. The plaintiff and the non-
smoking passenger began fighting after the plaintiff
refused, in response to the nonsmoking passenger's re-
quest, to stop smoking. Immediately after the incident, a
flight attendant advised the plaintiff to settle down; other-
wise, the FBI would be summoned when the aircraft
landed. The flight attendant then escorted the plaintiff
against his will to the rear of the aircraft where he re-
mained for the duration of the flight. The plaintiff alleged
that he was assaulted as a direct result of the negligent
acts of the airline and its agents. The airline moved for
summary judgment, contending that it could not be held
accountable for the unforeseeable actions of the non-
smoking passenger. The trial court granted the airline's
motion.84
On appeal, the New Jersey Superior Court reversed the
trial court. The court held that although the lower court
properly evaluated the airline's conduct by attempting to
determine whether it had an obligation to protect passen-
gers from reasonably foreseeable harm by fellow passen-
gers and strangers, it improperly concluded that the
airline had no such duty because the harm could not have
been anticipated. 85 The superior court found that reason-
able jurors could have concluded that the air carrier
should have foreseen a flareup between a militant non-
smoker and an intransigent smoker in a situation the air-
line itself created, and it should have taken appropriate
safeguards to prevent the situation.86 Additionally, the
court found that a reasonable jury could have found the
conduct of the flight attendant abusive and insulting. 7
The court concluded that the issue of the flight attend-
84 Id. at 17,844.
H5 Id.
,6 Id. at 17,844-45.
97 Id. at 17,846.
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ant's conduct, as well as the issue of the airline's obliga-
tion to protect its passengers from reasonably foreseeable
harm, should have been submitted to the jury.88
B. Damages: Pre-Impact Suffering
In Larsen v. Delta Airlines,89 the surviving spouse of a de-
ceased passenger killed in a Delta aircraft crash sought
damages from the air carrier for her past and future pecu-
niary loss, loss of companionship and society, and mental
anguish. Pursuant to stipulations filed in the action, the
district court found that the air carrier did not contest lia-
bility and that the plaintiff was not required to establish
liability, fault, or proximate cause on the part of the de-
fendant in connection with the decedent's death. Further,
the court found that the decedent did not contribute to
the cause of his death. 90
The decedent's estate sought damages for the con-
scious pain and suffering the decedent experienced imme-
diately before his death. Although such damages are
recoverable under Texas law, the court noted that a dam-
age award for pre-impact mental anguish may not be
granted when the evidence is speculative or conjectural. 9'
Because of the conflicting and speculative testimony re-
garding the final minutes of the Delta flight, the court de-
nied an award of damages for any pre-impact suffering the
decedent may have experienced.92
C. Procedure
In Miller v. Delta Air Lines, " the parents of a passenger
who died in an aircraft crash filed a wrongful death diver-
sity action against the air carrier under Texas state law.
The decedent's daughter had previously filed a survivor
88 Id. at 17,845-46.
89 692 F. Supp. 714 (S.D. Tex. 1988).
- Id. at 718.
9' Id. at 721.
92 Id.
93 861 F.2d 814 (5th Cir. 1988).
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and wrongful death diversity action as representative of
the decedent's estate under Florida state law and received
a judgment in the amount of $775,000. 94
The Fifth Circuit held that the doctrine of res judicata
barred the parents' action because their claim was part of
the same cause of action that had been litigated in the
wrongful death action brought by the decedent's daugh-
ter in federal district court in Florida. 95 The parents ar-
gued that their claim was a separate cause of action
because the damages sought were fundamentally different
in kind from those pursued in the first suit. The court
held that this was not enough to prevent the operation of
res judicata.96 The parents argued that they were neither
parties nor privy to the first suit. The court found that the
parents were effectively the same party as, or in privity
with, the daughter under Florida's wrongful death statute.
The court affirmed the district court's summary judgment
in favor of the air carrier on the grounds of res judicata.9 '
In Love v. Port Authority,98 the plaintiff, an employee of
United Airlines (United), alleged negligence in the New
York and New Jersey Port Authority's ownership, opera-
tion, management, and control of United's premises at
John F. Kennedy International Airport, where the plaintiff
fell and incurred physical injuries.
United leased the premises from the Port Authority,
and the plaintiff contended that the Port Authority was li-
able for his injuries because a landlord has a duty to keep
its property repaired in accordance with New York City's
administrative regulations. The plaintiff, also argued that
United should be impleaded as a necessary third party,
because under the terms of its lease with the Port Author-
ity, United was responsible for maintaining the premises
in a safe condition.
- Id. at 815.
9" Id. at 817.
- Id. at 817-18.
97 Id. at 818.
-m 21 Av. Cas. (CCH) 18,521 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1989).
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The New York Supreme Court granted the Port Au-
thority's cross-motion for summary judgment. The court
concluded that the Port Authority was a state agency and,
therefore, was exempt from local regulation. The court
also relied on the fact that United's lease provided that
the air carrier would maintain the premises. The fact that
a provision of the lease gave the Port Authority the right
to re-enter did not mean that it had control of the prem-
ises. 99 Finally, the court held that the plaintiff could not
bring in United as a necessary party because impleader is
only available to a defendant.'0 0
In re Air Crash Disaster at Stapleton International Airport,
Denver, Colorado, November 15, 1987,01 addressed the
problems of multidistrict litigation. The district court con-
cluded that just and efficientdisposition of the plaintiffs'
claims would be best served by a plan consolidating all
claims arising from the crash in the Colorado district
court for trial and resolution of common issues. In reach-
ing its decision, the court considered the overall conven-
ience of the parties, as opposed to individual preferences,
and the fact that most of the evidence and witnesses were
located in Denver. 0 2 After determination of the common
issues, the cases transferred to the Colorado District court
would be returned to their original forums.
The court also ordered a bifurcated test on the issues of
common law tort liability and punitive damages. Because
the issues were substantially separate and distinct, the
court determined that bifurcation would reduce the bur-
den of trial preparation. The court concluded that a sepa-
rate determination of liability might resolve various issues
frustrating settlement and, thus, possibly prevent the
need for a separate damages trial. 0 3
- id. at 18,522.
1o Id.
lo, 720 F. Supp. 1455 (D. Colo. 1988).
102 Id. at 1458.
,0s Id. at 1458-59.
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VIII. EVIDENCE
A. Admissibility of Federal Agency Investigatory Reports
The United States Supreme Court, in Beech Aircraft Corp.
v. Rainey,"°4 held that portions of an investigatory report,
otherwise admissible under the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence, were not inadmissible merely because they stated a
conclusion or opinion. In Rainey, a Navy training aircraft
crashed during a training exercise, killing a flight instruc-
tor and her student. Because of severe damage to the
aircraft and the fact that there were no survivors, the
cause of the crash could not be determined with certainty.
The surviving spouses brought a products liability suit
against Beech Aircraft Corporation, the plane's manufac-
turer, and Beech Aerospace Services, Inc., the Navy's
maintenance and servicing contractor. The plaintiffs al-
leged that loss of engine power, due to a fuel control sys-
tem defect, had caused the crash. The defendants alleged
pilot error, suggesting that the aircraft had stalled during
an abrupt maneuver.1 0 5
The Supreme Court addressed the long-standing con-
flict among the circuit courts over whether Federal Rule
of Evidence 803(8)(C), which provides an exception to the
hearsay rule for public investigatory reports containing
"factual findings," extends to allow admission if the re-
ports contain conclusions and opinions.
The primary issue during trial was whether pilot error
or equipment malfunction had caused the crash. Both
sides relied primarily on expert testimony. The defense
presented an investigative report prepared on order of
the training squadron's commanding officer pursuant to
authority granted in the manual of the Judge Advocate
General (JAG Report). TheJAG Report included findings
of fact, opinions, and recommendations supported by
over sixty attachments. The trial judge initially deter-
mined that the JAG Report was sufficiently trustworthy
,r 488 U.S. 153 (1988).
"o Id. at 156-57.
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and admissible with respect to its "factual findings," but
that portions including opinions or conclusions would not
be admissible. The day before trial, however, the court re-
versed its ruling, over the plaintiffs objections, and
agreed to admit some of the conclusions concerning the
impossibility of determining exactly how the crash oc-
curred and information allegedly concerning pilot
error. 106
The jury returned a verdict for the defendant, but the
Eleventh Circuit reversed and remanded for a new trial.
The panel agreed with the plaintiff's argument that Fed-
eral Rule of Evidence 803(8)(C) did not encompass valua-
tive conclusions or opinions. The panel held that
conclusions contained in the JAG Report should have
been excluded. On rehearing en banc, the court of appeals
divided evenly on the question of admissibility under Rule
803(8)(C) and reinstated the panel decision. 117 The
Supreme Court granted certiorari.
Because the Federal Rules of Evidence are legislative
enactments, the Supreme Court looked at the traditional
tools of statutory construction in order to construe the
rule's provisions. The Court examined the rule's lan-
guage, its legislative history, and its framers' intent. The
Court took a broad approach to admissibility under Rule
803(8)(C), looking to the rule's plain language permitting
admission of reports propounding factual findings. The
Court felt the rule's limitations and safeguards lay else-
where. First, the requirement that reports contain factual
findings barred the admission of statements not based on
factual investigation. Second, the trustworthiness provi-
sion required the trial court to determine whether the re-
port, or any portion thereof, was sufficiently trustworthy
to be admitted. The Court found no reason to strain an
interpretation of Rule 803(8)(C) that was contrary to the
liberal thrust of the federal rules. 0 8
Ioo ld. at 159.
,o7 827 F.2d 1498 (11th Cir. 1987).
loo Rainey, 488 U.S. at 169.
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The Supreme Court held that portions of investigatory
reports are admissible despite the fact that they state a
conclusion or opinion. As long as the conclusion is based
on a factual investigation and satisfies the rule's trustwor-
thiness requirement it should be admissible, along with
other admissible portions of the report. The Court
agreed with the trial judge's determination that certain of
the JAG Report's conclusions were trustworthy and,
therefore, were correctly admitted into evidence. The
Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals with re-
spect to the Rule 803(8)(C) issue, but remanded the case
on other grounds.'0 9
In In re Aircrash in Bali, Indonesia," the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals affirmed a district court decision involv-
ing a fatal aircrash, finding no reversible error in the ad-
mission of a Federal Aviation Administrative (FAA) report
concerning Pan American World Airways' (Pan Am) safety
record and procedures, and the admission of the airline's
report of its own safety record and problems.' The case
involved the crash of a Pan Am flight in Bali in which all
the crew and passengers were killed.
Pan Am contended that admission of the FAA and Pan
Am reports constituted reversible error. The court of ap-
peals concluded that the trial court had broad discretion
to admit or exclude evidence and reviewed the trial
court's decision only for an abuse of its discretion. Even if
an error were found, reversal would be appropriate only if
the court could determine that the error affected the sub-
stantial rights of the parties. ' 2
The court found that the FAA report was properly ad-
mitted, pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 803(8)(C),
which creates a hearsay exception for public documents.
The court, relying on the Supreme Court decision in
'I ld. at 175.
871 F.2d 812 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, sub nom. Pan American World Airways,
Inc. v. Causey, 110 S. Ct. 277 (1989).
1' id. at 816.
112 Id.
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Rainey, found that the report was not inadmissible simply
because it included valuative or normative findings. Fur-
ther, Pan Am failed to demonstrate that the FAA report
was untrustworthy or unduly prejudicial." 13
Pan Am further argued that the district court erred in
admitting Pan Am's report, pursuant to Rule 801 (c) (2) (D)
and that the report was unduly prejudicial. The rule pro-
vides that a statement is not hearsay if it is offered against
a party opponent and is a statement made by the party's
employee concerning a matter within the scope of the em-
ployment made during the existence of the employment
relationship. The court held that the report was admissi-
ble as an admission of Pan Am employees concerning
matters within the scope of their employment, since all
but eight of the authors of the report were experienced
Pan Am crew members." 14
Finally, Pan Am argued that both the reports, in effect,
were subsequent remedial measures and were thus inad-
missible under Federal Rule of Evidence 407.' 15 Since
Pan Am's report took many months to prepare and was
dated only one day after the crash, it was apparent to the
court that the report was not a response to the crash. The
court found no basis for treating it as a subsequent reme-
dial measure.
Furthermore, the court concluded that the FAA report
was not a subsequent remedial measure within the mean-
ing of Rule 407. The FAA investigation began five days
after the crash and the report was dated fourteen months
after the crash. The FAA report did not qualify as a sub-
sequent remedial measure because it was prepared by the
FAA without the voluntary participation of Pan Am. Pan
Am's management was legally obligated to cooperate with
the FAA's investigation, thus admission of the FAA report
113 Id.
114 Id.
115 FED. R. EVID. 407 states that evidence of measures taken after an event
which would have made the event less likely to occur is not admissible to prove
culpable conduct. FED. R. EvID. 407.
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did not penalize Pan Am for its voluntary participation in
safety measures. 116
In In re Air Crash Disaster at Stapleton International Airport,
Denver, Colorado, November 15, 1987,1 17 the court admitted
an accident investigation report of the National Transpor-
tation Safety Board (NTSB) into evidence, since the re-
port was tendered in support of the passengers' claims for
negligence, punitive damages, and false advertising of pi-
lot qualifications and safety under the Texas Deceptive
Trade Practices Act. After the aircraft crash, the NTSB, in
accordance with federal regulations, began an investiga-
tion. The report found in part that pilot error and im-
proper de-icing procedures caused the crash. The report
included an appendix which covered "Human Factors"
contributing to the crash. The plaintiffs tendered por-
tions of the report, including the appendix, in support of
their claims. The defendants objected generally to admis-
sion of the report and specifically to the admission of the
appendix which suggested that the cockpit crew, and es-
pecially the copilot in control of the aircraft, lacked the
qualifications necessary to fly the DC-9 in the weather
conditions confronted on the day of the crash. The court
ruled formally on the objections and admitted the edited
report into evidence." i8
The district court reaffirmed admission of the edited
NTSB report but noted a federal statutory limitation on
the admissibility of NTSB reports. The statute excluded
from evidence any NTSB reports relating to an accident
or investigation and precluded a report's use in any suit
or action for damages arising out of the materials con-
tained in the report.' 19
11 Aircrash at Bali, 871 F.2d at 817.
1' 720 F. Supp. 1493 (D. Colo. 1988).
118 Id. at 1495.
1'" 49 U.S.C. app. § 1441(e) (1988). "No part of any report or reports of the
National Transportation Safety Board relating to any accident or the investigation
thereof, shall be admitted as evidence or used in any suit or action for damages
growing out of any matter mentioned in such report or reports." 49 U.S.C. app.
§ 1441(e).
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Because many of the plaintiffs' claims had originally
been filed in Idaho, the defendants urged the district
court to apply a Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruling that
the statute acted as a complete bar to the admission of any
portion of the final NTSB report. The district court de-
termined, however, that the Tenth Circuit's contrary
holding on the issue should apply because it was the con-
trolling precedent for federal courts sitting in Colorado,
the forum to which all the plaintiffs' claims had been
transferred for pre-trial and trial purposes. 20
The Tenth Circuit had held that the federal statute did
not totally prohibit admission of all evaluation, opinion,
and conclusion evidence. The primary emphasis of the
provision was to exclude reports which expressed the
NTSB's views as to the probable cause of the accident.
Further, the legislative history of the statute demon-
strated that its purpose was to prevent usurpation of the
jury's role by evidentiary use of the NTSB's conclusion
about the probable cause of the accident. The district
court found that these persuasive evidentiary principles
controlled the admissibility of the NTSB report and de-
nied the defendants' motion to exclude the entire
NTSB.12 1
The court determined, however, that its ruling did not
resolve the issue of the appendix's admissibility. To re-
solve this question, the court relied on the Supreme
Court's decision in Rainey. The court concluded that the
appendix would be admissible under Federal Rule of Evi-
dence 803(3)(C) even though it contained conclusions, as
long as those conclusions were based on factual investiga-
tion and were trustworthy under evidentiary rules. Be-
cause the appendix had been prepared following the
NTSB's pretrial investigation of the crash, its admissibility
depended on a determination that the report was trust-
worthy. The court applied four factors articulated by the
120 Air Crash at Denver, 720 F. Supp. at 1496.
121 Id. (relying on Keen v. Detroit Diesel Allison, 569 F.2d 547, 549-51 (10th
Cir. 1978)).
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Tenth Circuit for determining the trustworthiness of gov-
ernment reports: (1) the timeliness of the investigation,
(2) the special skills or experience of the investigator, (3)
whether a hearing was held and the level at which it was
conducted, and (4) any possible motivation or bias
problems in preparing the report.122 The fact that the
agency preparing the report had an interest in its conclu-
sions went to the weight accorded the evidence, not to its
admissibility, absent a specific showing of bias. Since the
appendix had been adopted in the NTSB's final report,
the report, taken as a whole, satisfied the trustworthiness
requirement of Rainey. The court concluded that the re-
port was not based principally on hearsay and was not so
filled with inadmissible conclusions that the entire report
should have been excluded. 23
IX. INSURANCE
A. Coverage
In Monarch Insurance Co. v. Castellano,'2 4 the plaintiff in-
sured the defendant's single-engine plane. The insurance
policy specifically limited coverage to occurrences and
losses on flights within the continental United States,
Canada and Mexico, and provided no coverage on flights
more than ten miles off shore. The engine on the defend-
ant's single-engine aircraft failed in mid-flight on a trip
from Florida to the Bahamas. The defendant was forced
to "ditch" the aircraft in the Atlantic Ocean approxi-
mately ten miles off the Florida coast.
The defendant filed a claim with Monarch for the loss of
his aircraft. Monarch denied liability because of the spe-
cific policy provisions. Monarch then filed a declaratory
judgment action to determine its liability to the defendant
under the insurance policy. The trial court found that the
1 Id. at 1498 (citing Perrin v. Anderson, 784 F.2d 1040, 1047 (10th Cir.
1986)).
12-. Id. at 1499.
,2 176 I1. App. 3d 849, 531 N.E.2d 908 (1988).
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policy provisions did not cover the loss. 2 5
On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial court's
grant of summary judgment in favor of Monarch should
be reversed because the territorial coverage provision of
the policy was ambiguous. The Illinois appellate court af-
firmed the trial court's judgment and held that the lan-
guage of the insurance policy was not ambiguous and
should be read as providing coverage only for flights
within the continental United States, Canada, or Mexico.
For aviation insurance coverage purposes, the court held
that when a policy provided coverage for a loss within the
United States, the geographical limit included only the
continental landspace of the United States, three nautical
miles from the shore, and "the outside boundaries of an
area within which flights, on reasonable routes, [were]
covered." 6
In General Electric Credit Corp. v. Kelly & Dearing Avia-
tion, 2 7 Kelly & Dearing (K&D) had purchased an aircraft
with funding provided by General Electric Credit Corpo-
ration (GECC). K&D subsequently leased the aircraft to a
pilot who obtained insurance coverage for both himself
and K&D. The pilot also obtained a lienholder's endorse-
ment to the policy protecting GECC's interest. The en-
dorsement excluded coverage in the event of
"conversion, embezzlement or secretion of the
aircraft." 128
The pilot flew the aircraft to Santa Marie, Colombia,
where it was seized by the Colombian government.
GECC filed a claim against the insurance policy but was
denied recovery when the insurance company discovered
that the loss occurred outside the continental United
States, the pilot himself was not covered because he did
not meet the minimum pilot qualifications required under
I ld., 531 N.E.2d at 909.
126 Id. (quoting Vargas v. Insurance Co. of N. America, 651 F.2d 838, 840 (2d
Cir. 1981)).
,27 765 S.W.2d 750 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1988).
12I ld. at 751.
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the policy, and the aircraft had been seized by a foreign
government. The insurance company claimed that these
policy violations amounted to a conversion of the aircraft.
GECC filed suit for recovery under the lienholder's en-
dorsement. The trial court entered judgment in favor of
GECC, concluding that although the pilot may have vio-
lated the policy, thereby precluding any claim the pilot
and K&D might have, GECC had an independent right of
recovery under the lienholder's endorsement. 29 On ap-
peal, the Tennessee Court of Appeals determined that
although the lienholder's endorsement protected GECC
regardless of any acts of the pilot, the pilot's actions had
effectively deprived GECC of its property for an indefinite
period of time. The court held that an effective conver-
sion of the aircraft had occurred and GECC could not re-
cover on its claim.' 30
B. Exclusions
In Monarch Insurance Co. v. Polytech Industries, Inc., 13' the
plaintiff, Monarch Insurance Company (Monarch), filed
suit seeking a declaratory judgment to determine its liabil-
ity under the insured's insurance policy. The claim arose
from the crash of a Cessna aircraft owned by Polytech In-
dustries, Inc. (Polytech). The crash occurred when a pro-
spective purchaser of the aircraft took it on a flight for
demonstration purposes, accompanied by Polytech's ex-
ecutive vice president. Although both men were pilots,
neither was properly certified for the aircraft at the time of
the flight. In addition, the insured failed to have the air-
craft inspected as required by FAA regulations, preclud-
ing recovery for loss of the aircraft under Georgia state
law.
The district court held that Polytech's failure to per-
form the annual FAA inspection constituted a violation of
the aircraft's airworthiness certificate, thus suspending
1'2 Id. at 752.
.- Id. at 754.
13, 655 F. Supp. 1058 (M.D. Ga. 1987), aff'd 833 F.2d 1020 (11th Cir. 1988).
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coverage under the terms of the insurance policy. Recov-
ery under the policy was also precluded because neither
pilot was properly certified in accordance with FAA regu-
lations. Therefore, the plaintiff's motion for summary
judgment was granted.132
In Gardner Trucking, Inc. v. South Carolina Insurance Guar-
anty Association,13 3 Gardner Trucking, Inc. (Gardner),
brought an action against the South Carolina Guaranty
Association (Guaranty Association) to recover insurance
proceeds for damages to a Piper Comanche aircraft. The
owner hired a pilot to fly the aircraft to South Carolina
from Indiana. While the pilot was attempting to land, the
aircraft's landing gear malfunctioned, and the underside
of the plane was severely damaged. Several days after the
crash, the owner reported to the sheriff's department that
the aircraft had been stolen. Evidence revealed that the
pilot had little experience with retractable gear aircraft
and only ten hours experience in the Comanche model.
In addition, the aircraft did not have an airworthiness
certificate.
Guaranty Association denied the owner coverage for
the damage to the aircraft on the basis of three policy ex-
clusions. First, the insurer determined that the aircraft
was converted while in the possession of the pilot, who
the insurer contended was a bailee. Second, the FAA had
not issued an airworthiness certificate. Third, the owner
had entrusted the airplane to a pilot who lacked the re-
quired hours and experience on the particular type of air-
craft. The trial court granted a summary judgment in
favor of Guaranty Association, on the basis of all three
policy exclusions.1 3 4
The owner appealed only the issue of the applicability
of the policy's conversion provision. The owner con-
ceded that he abandoned his exception with respect to the
two other insurance exclusions. Because any of the three
1-2 655 F. Supp. at 1065.
1" 297 S.C. 235, 376 S.E.2d 260 (1989).
- Id., 376 S.E 2d at 262.
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insurance provisions would independently exclude cover-
age, the South Carolina Supreme Court considered only
whether either of the abandoned exclusions was causally
connected to the loss. The court concluded that the pilot
flew without the experience required under the insurance
policy, and the owner did not dispute that the pilot's lack
of experience was causally connected to the crash. Thus,
the court held that the trial court properly granted a de-
claratory judgment in favor of Guaranty Association. 35
X. AIRPORTS
A. Negligence
In Hill Air of Gadsen, Inc. v. Marshall,136 the owner of an
aircraft brought suit for breach of contract and negligence
against a mooring company after the aircraft was damaged
at a tie-down facility during a severe thunderstorm. At
trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the owner, and
the mooring company appealed to the Alabama Supreme
Court after its motion for judgment notwithstanding the
verdict was denied. 137
The court concluded that there was substantial evi-
dence to sustain the jury's verdict, and the jury was war-
ranted in finding that the damage to the aircraft could
have been prevented had the mooring company used ade-
quate means to anchor it. The court reasoned that since
the storm was not such a bizarre occurrence that it could
not have been reasonably anticipated, and since it ap-
peared that the damages would not have occurred but for
the negligence of the tie-down facility's owner, the trial
court did not err in refusing to direct a verdict in favor of
the mooring company. 138
In Blum v. Airport Terminal Services, Inc. ,' 3 a wrongful
death action was filed against several defendants after a
'I's Id.
1m; 526 So.2d 15 (Ala. 1988).
1-47 Id. at 16.
Id. at 17.
"' 762 S.W.2d 67 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988).
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fatal crash resulting from the misfueling of an aircraft.
The jury returned verdicts against two of the defendants.
The City of St. Louis was found negligent for failing to
regulate refueling services at the airport, and Airport Ter-
minal Services (ATS) was found negligent in conducting
its refueling services of the aircraft.
ATS appealed the jury verdict to the Missouri Court of
Appeals on the grounds that the damages awarded were
excessive and that the trial court had improperly in-
structed the jury on the issue of damage assessment. The
court found that evidence introduced at trial established
that in a high risk operation, such as the refueling of air-
craft, which involved the possibility of catastrophic conse-
quences to human life and health, ATS, presumably an
expert in the field, denied its employees the training and
protection necessary to avert tragedy. The court deter-
mined that this conduct reflected a want of care indicative
of an indifference to the consequences. The court held
that the aggravated circumstances language of the trial
court's jury instruction was properly included, and the
trial court did not err in failing to define aggravated
circumstances. 140
The jury had found that the City of St. Louis, which had
granted a lease to ATS, breached its continuing, non-del-
egable, legal duty to comply with federal regulations. The
regulations required that the city ensure that its tenants
had a sufficient number of trained personnel and proce-
dures for safely storing, dispensing, and otherwise han-
dling fuel, including marking and labeling storage tanks
and identifying specific types of fuel. 14
On appeal, the court had no difficulty in finding evi-
dence sufficient to establish the city's breach of its contin-
uing nondelegable duty. Because of the potential for
disaster to both crew personnel and the general public,
the federal regulations imposing an affirmative supervi-
sory duty on the city, and the city's failure in any way to
140 Id. at 74.
141 14 C.F.R. § 139.321(a), (d) (1990).
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comply with its duty, the court held that the trial court's
submission of a jury instruction on aggravating circum-
stances was not erroneous. The court concluded that the
city had a duty under federal regulations to ensure that
operations at its airports were conducted safely by both
the city and its tenants. Failure of the city's key employee
to be aware of the existence of that duty and to investigate
or discuss safety with ATS evidenced a complete indiffer-
ence to and a conscious disregard for the safety of others.
Therefore, the court determined that damages were prop-
erly awarded against the city.1 42
B. Searches and Airport Security
In United States v. $124,570,143 a flight terminal security
(FTS) officer operating a security scanner at Seattle Inter-
national Airport picked up a dark mass inside the defend-
ant's briefcase on the X-ray screen. After asking the
defendant to open the briefcase, the FTS security officer
found a large quantity of currency. In accordance with
airport policy, the FTS officer returned the briefcase to
the defendant and notified the United States Customs
Service and airport police. Drug Enforcement Adminis-
tration (DEA) agents met the defendant's flight in Los An-
geles and had narcotic-sniffing dogs check it for signs of
illicit drugs. Based upon the dogs' reactions, the DEA
agents determined that the currency had come in contact
with at least one illegal substance.
The United States filed a civil forfeiture action pursuant
to federal statute. 44 The defendant moved to suppress
the evidence found in his briefcase, but the trial court
142 Blum, 762 S.W.2d at 77.
14- 873 F.2d 1240 (9th Cir. 1989).
144 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6) (1988). This statute provides that certain property is
subject to forfeiture in situations where the defendant allegedly has used the
property in any relationship to illegal drugs and contraband as defined in 21
U.S.C. § 802 (1988). Specifically, 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6) subjects to forfeiture
"[a]ll moneys . . . furnished or intended to be furnished by any person in ex-
change for a controlled substance .... " 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6).
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ruled that the currency was subject to forfeiture.' 4 5
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit held that the use of airport
security screening systems to achieve ends unrelated to
air safety violated the constitutional rights of commercial
air travelers. The court found that airport security checks
were administrative searches, and, like all other govern-
mental searches, subject to the Fourth Amendment's rea-
sonableness requirement. To the extent that
administrative searches were used for purposes other than
those contemplated by the regulatory scheme, they fell
outside the scope of their approved purpose. The court
noted that administrative searches were not searches au-
thorized for use as part of a criminal investigation to se-
cure evidence of a crime.
In an earlier case, Davis v. United States,14 6 the Ninth Cir-
cuit had approved airport security searches based on the
understanding that they would be limited to searches for
guns or explosives and that they would be no more bur-
densome than necessary to achieve that objective. In Da-
vis, the court relied on a United States Supreme Court
decision in which the Court held that administrative
searches were generally reasonable because they were
"neither personal in nature nor aimed at discovery of evi-
dence of a crime [and involved a] relatively limited inva-
sion of privacy."'147 The United States v. $124,570 court
held that a limited administrative search cannot also serve
unrelated law enforcement purposes. To the extent the
defendant was identified by FTS officials and reported to
the Customs agents, the search by the Customs agents
could not be justified as an administrative search on the
basis of governmental interest in ensuring air traffic
safety. 148
The court also considered whether the search would be
justified under any exception to the warrant requirement.
United States v. $124,570, 873 F.2d at 1242.
146 482 F.2d 893 (9th Cir. 1973).
147 Camara v. Municipal Ct., 387 U.S. 523, 537 (1967).
14. United States v. $124,570, 873 F.2d at 1247.
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The court was reluctant to hold that the consent given for
airport security searches exceeded the rationale of those
searches. The court concluded that the exceptions to the
warrant requirement established for exigent circum-
stances, inventory searches, or border searches were not
applicable. Accordingly, the trial court's order denying a
motion to suppress the evidence uncovered by the search
of the briefcase was reversed.' 4 9
XI. FAA REGULATIONS
A. FAA Suspension of Certificates
In ConnAire, Inc. v. Secretary, United States Department of
Transportation,151 ConnAire appealed a National Transpor-
tation Safety Board (NTSB) order suspending ConnAire's
air carrier operating certificate. Prior to the NTSB order,
the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) had issued an
emergency order revoking ConnAire's certificate, alleging
that ConnAire was guilty of violating Federal Aviation
Regulations resulting in a serious threat to public safety.
The alleged violations included aircraft operation without
appropriate pilot ratings certification and failure to keep
accurate flight time and maintenance records. In a hear-
ing before an NTSB Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), the
ALJ found substantial evidence supporting many of the
FAA's allegations of ConnAire's violations of federal reg-
ulations. The ALJ concluded, however, that ConnAire's
violations, while serious, did not merit the penalty of rev-
ocation. The ALJ ordered ConnAire's certificate sus-
pended for one hundred twenty days, ending the
emergency revocation. Both the FAA and ConnAire ap-
pealed to the NTSB, and the suspension was stayed pend-
ing the appeal.'' The NTSB unanimously held that there
was sufficient evidence to support the ALJ's findings with
regard to ConnAire's violations. ConnAire appealed to
14', id. at 1248.
150 887 F.2d 723 (6th Cir. 1989).
1I Id. at 724.
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the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.
While the appeal was pending, ConnAire completed its
suspension.152
The FAA contended that ConnAire's appeal was moot
because it had served its suspension and there was noth-
ing to appeal. The court of appeals, however, concluded
that the case was not moot because it was reasonably fore-
seeable that the FAA might have future dealings with
ConnAire and that a suspension on ConnAire's record
would likely affect that relationship. The court deter-
mined that the suspension was a situation "capable of rep-
etition, yet evading review" and constituted an exception
to the mootness doctrine. 153
The court considered, but ultimately rejected, Con-
nAire's contention that the FAA abused its discretion by
originally revoking ConnAire's certificate in violation of
its own guidelines. The court viewed ConnAire's inter-
pretation of the guidelines as too narrow. Neither the
court nor the NTSB could hold the FAA to its internal
guidelines if those guidelines were inconsistent with the
agency's statutory mandate. If the FAA had statutory au-
thority for its actions and the guidelines conflicted with
that authority, then the statute had to be given preference
over the guidelines. The pertinent statute, stated, in part:
"If [the Secretary of Transportation] determines that
safety in air commerce or transportation and the public
interest requires, the Secretary of Transportation may is-
sue an order ... suspending, or revoking, in whole or in
part, any type certificate .... ,,4 In determining whether
such a suspension or revocation should be ordered, "the
findings of fact by the Board or the Secretary of Transpor-
tation, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be
conclusive." '55
As to the FAA's use of its discretion, the Sixth Circuit
1' Id. at 725.
1s Id. at 726.
- 49 U.S.C. app. § 1429(a) (1988).
,55 49 U.S.C. app. § 1486(e) (1988).
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found that there was more than enough evidence to show
that the agency reasonably could have concluded that
ConnAire showed " 'a lack of capability'; an 'unwilling-
ness to comply with the principles of air safety'; or 'abuses
that were detrimental to the public interest.' 156 The evi-
dence, as the ALJ found, revealed serious violations, wor-
thy of serious action under a fair interpretation of the
FAA's guidelines. Accordingly, the FAA properly revoked
ConnAire's certificate, based upon its findings that it was
guilty of violating several Federal Aviation Regulations re-
sulting in a serious threat to public safety.' 57
Finally, ConnAire argued that the NTSB erred when it
refused to determine if the FAA's actions were taken in
accordance with its guidelines. The NTSB stated that "we
agree with the administrator that the NTSB's role is not to
evaluate the administrator's enforcement program in
terms of the FAA enforcement manual and that the ad-
ministrator's exercise of discretion in selection of the type
of penalty ... is unreviewable." 5 8
ConnAire contended that the NTSB had the authority,
under its general power, to hear an appeal on the issue of
whether the FAA has followed its internal guidelines. The
court of appeals rejected ConnAire's contentions. The
court concluded that while the NTSB did have "power to
review the agency's compliance with its policies in cases
where the policies interpreted were relatively specific and
of a type that would be relied upon by private parties, this
was not the case here."'' 59 The court affirmed the NTSB
decision.
B. Judicial Review of FAA Decisions
In Chritton v. National Transportation Safety Board,'6 0 an
emergency medical evacuation pilot sought review of an
,56 ConnAire, 887 F.2d at 727.
157 Id. at 728.
158 Id.
159 Id.
1- 888 F.2d 854 (D.C.Cir. 1989).
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NTSB order suspending his commercial pilot's license be-
cause of a helicopter crash. In considering the pilot's ap-
peal, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals concluded
that it was required to review the NTSB decision in ac-
cordance with the provisions of the Administrative Proce-
dures Act, which provided that the applicable standard of
review was the substantial evidence test.' 6 ' The court
found that the test required it to uphold an administrative
agency's order if, on review, it determined that there was
substantial evidence, defined as relevant evidence that a
reasonable mind would accept as adequate to support the
agency's conclusion, even though a plausible alternative
interpretation of the evidence would support a contrary
view.
The court concluded that there was substantial evi-
dence to uphold the NTSB's finding of pilot negligence.
The pilot had apparently run into some power lines in ad-
verse weather. Based on earlier weather reports conveyed
to the pilot, the court found that the adverse weather con-
ditions were foreseeable. Additionally, the power lines
also were a foreseeable condition, since they were clearly
marked on the pilot's flight chart, and the pilot had flown
the route before. Based on the evidence presented, the
court agreed with the NTSB's finding that the pilot was
negligent in failing to avoid known or foreseeable
circumstances. 162
The court then examined the NTSB's rejection of the
pilot's emergency defense. 63 In interpreting the defense,
the court found that the emergency doctrine applied only
under sudden and unexpected situations. Only unfore-
seeable adverse weather would constitute an emergency
16, See 49 U.S.C. app. § 1903(d) (1988). The court defined substantial evidence
as "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to sup-
port a conclusion." Chritton, 888 F.2d at 856 (quoting Refrigerated Transport Co.
v. I.C.C., 616 F.2d 748 (5th Cir. 1980).
162 Chritton, 888 F.2d at 860.
16 See 14 C.F.R. § 91.3(b) (1990). This regulation provides that "[iln an emer-
gency requiring immediate action, the pilot in command may deviate from any
rule ... to the extent required to meet that emergency." 14 C.F.R. § 91.3(b).
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triggering the defense. The court found the NTSB had
acted reasonably in rejecting the emergency defense,
since the plaintiff should have reasonably foreseen the
bad weather conditions. Accordingly, the court affirmed
the NTSB's opinion.1 6 4
In Hill v. National Transportation Safety Board,'65 the plain-
tiff, a helicopter pilot, sought review of an NTSB order
upholding the FAA's suspension of his flight certificate
for failing to maintain a safe minimum altitude and for op-
erating an aircraft in a careless or reckless manner so as to
endanger the life or property of another. The pilot con-
tended that the alleged violations occurred in air space
outside FAA jurisdiction. The Tenth Circuit noted that,
under federal statute,1 66 the Secretary of Transportation
was authorized to regulate the use of navigable air space
under such terms, conditions, and limitations as he
deemed necessary to insure the safety of aircraft and the
efficient utilization of such air space. The court also
found that the FAA had the power to revoke, suspend or
modify a pilot's aviation certificate if the Secretary deter-
mined it necessary in the interest of safety in air
commerce. 
67
The court did determine that the incidents for which
the pilot was sanctioned involved intrastate flights only
and occurred outside navigable air space as defined in the
applicable federal statutes. 68 Nevertheless, the court
concluded that the FAA still had the authority to suspend
the pilot's aviation certificate. The fact that the pilot's
conduct in a particular incident did not actually endanger
interstate, overseas, or foreign air commerce did not ex-
empt such conduct from FAA jurisdiction. The court fur-
ther concluded that by holding an FAA issued aviation
certificate, the pilot submitted to the FAA's jurisdiction
- Chritton, 888 F.2d at 860.
886 F.2d 1275 (10th Cir. 1989).
' 49 U.S.C. app. § 1348(a) (1988).
1" 49 U.S.C. app. § 1429(a) (1988).
1- Hill, 886 F.2d at 1281.
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regarding any operation of aircraft that may affect safety
and air commerce.' 69
C. Drug Related Suspensions of Certificates
In French v. Pan Am Express, Inc.,17° the plaintiff, who had
been fired by Pan Am for refusing to submit to drug test-
ing, filed suit in Rhode Island Superior Court, seeking
damages, reinstatement, and an order enjoining Pan Am
from requiring him to submit to drug tests. The plaintiff
claimed that Pan Am's drug testing program violated state
statutes regulating the circumstances under which an em-
ployer could require its employees to submit to testing.
The sole issue on appeal was whether the state statute was
pre-empted by the drug testing provision of the Federal
Aviation Act, as applied to airline pilots employed by in-
terstate air carriers.' 71
The First Circuit Court of Appeals held that the federal
statute pre-empted state law for the purposes of providing
criteria for testing aviation employees for drugs. The
court concluded that federal law assigned overall respon-
sibility for prescribing rules governing pilot qualifications
to the Secretary of Transportation. The intricate web of
statutory provisions afforded no room for the imposition
of state law criteria concerning pilot suitability. The court
inferred from the Federal Aviation Act an unmistakably
clear intent to occupy the field of pilot regulation related
to air safety, to the exclusion of state law. Such an intent
was implicit in the pervasiveness of relevant federal regu-
lations, the dominance of federal interest, and the legisla-
tive goal of establishing a single, uniform system of
control over air safety.172
In Mines v. National Transportation Safety Board,7 1 the
plaintiff petitioned for review of an NTSB order affirming
lf Id. at 1282.
,70 869 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1989).
,7, See 49 U.S.C. app. § 1421(a)(6) (1988); 14 C.F.R. § 91.11(c)(2) (1990).
,72 French, 869 F.2d at 6-7.
,7. 862 F.2d 617 (6th Cir. 1988).
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an FAA ruling revoking the plaintiff's transport pilot cer-
tificate for illegal drug offenses in violation of federal reg-
ulations. 74  The plaintiff had been convicted of
conspiracy to possess marijuana, with intent to distribute,
but the trial judge suspended the plaintiff's sentence pur-
suant to the Youth Corrections Act (YCA)'17 and placed
him on probation with supervision for five years. The
court later issued a Certificate of Vacation of Conviction
pursuant the YCA. Prior to the trial court's setting aside
the plaintiff's conviction, the FAA revoked his airline
transport pilot's certificate. The NTSB upheld the FAA's
action on the ground that the YCA did not preclude an
agency from considering a youth offender's conviction in
determining his qualification to hold a federal license or
certificate. The Sixth Circuit reversed the NTSB's revoca-
tion order, holding that once the pilot's conviction was set
aside pursuant to the YCA, the NTSB was not permitted
to consider it as the predicate conviction in its finding of a
violation of a federal regulation. The court rejected the
NTSB's argument that the YCA was a sentence statute
and not an expungement statute. Relying on its previous
decision in United State v. Fryer,' 76 the court held that a
conviction set aside under the YCA could not constitute a
conviction for purposes of revoking a certificate issued
under federal law, stating that the YCA by legislative de-
sign was intended to give the offender a second chance,
free from any record of conviction. 77
The NTSB contended that despite the expungement
and rehabilitative purposes of the YCA, the public's inter-
est in aviation safety demanded that the plaintiff's convic-
tion be taken into account in considering his qualifications
174 14 C.F.R. § 61.15(a) (1990).
17-5 18 U.S.C. §§ 5005-5026 (1982) (repealed 1984).
17r 545 F.2d 11 (6th Cir. 1976) (holding that a conviction set aside under the
federal Youth Corrections Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 5005-5026 (1982) (repealed 1984),
did not consitute a conviction for the purpose of violation of federal law for illegal
possession of firearms and for making false statements to federally licensed fire-
arms sellers).
177 Mines, 862 F.2d at 621.22.
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to be a pilot. The court recognized the problems that
drugs pose to society, particularly in terms of air safety
and transportation but found that the YCA did not limit
the setting aside of a drug-related conviction regardless of
other policy issues.178.
D. FAA Negligence
Fischer v. United States Department of Transportation,179
arose from the crash of a Cessna 441 in which a passenger
was injured and the pilot killed. The plaintiff claimed that
the FAA was negligent: 1) in failing to maintain minimum
altitude and position guidance for the aircraft, 2) in failing
to notify the pilot that the aircraft was below the minimum
descent altitude, 3) in failing to notify the pilot of the level
of terrain in the area; and 4) in providing adequate infor-
mation regarding weather conditions. The plaintiff al-
leged that these acts of negligence were the proximate
cause of his injuries. The FAA, one of the defendants, ar-
gued that the controller's actions in directing the aircraft
were discretionary functions, and the controller in fact
had followed established operational procedures. More-
over, the district court had no jurisdiction to review func-
tions and procedures established by federal government
agencies. The FAA also claimed that the pilot's negli-
gence was the proximate cause of the accident.
The district court found that the air traffic controller's
actions were not discretionary and were subject to review.
Relying on Stork v. United States,'80 the court found that a
controller's failure to warn the pilot of dangerous condi-
tions at an airport, even when the pilot knew of the dan-
gers, was a breach of the controller's duty. The fact that
the pilot may have known that he was flying the plane be-
low minimum levels, or that the weather was bad, did not
remove the air traffic controller's duty to warn the pilot of
178 Id. at 622.
17s, 22 Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,175 (N.D. Ohio 1989).
,so 430 F.2d 1104 (9th Cir. 1976).
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the conditions. 18 1
The court concluded that the government was under a
duty to warn the pilot about flight conditions. The plain-
tiff, however, failed to provide any evidence that the FAA
knew that the aircraft was below minimum levels. The
plaintiff also failed to provide any legal basis or evidence
that the controller had a duty to inform the pilot of the
level of the terrain or that the terrain posed a hazard. The
court granted the FAA's summary judgment motion on
these issues. 182
The plaintiff did provide evidence about the weather
conditions which revealed that two miles from the airport
where the crash occurred visibility was practically zero.
The controller had provided weather information for air-
port visibility only. The FAA argued that the failure, if
any, to provide weather information was not the proxi-
mate cause of the crash. The court agreed with the FAA,
finding that the pilot's disregard of his altitude, his co-
pilot's warning, and an altitude alert warning device were
the proximate causes of the crash. The court found that
the plaintiff did not offer evidence that would convince a
reasonable trier of fact that the FAA's alleged negligence
was the proximate cause of the accident. The court con-
cluded that the accident occurred because the pilot delib-
erately and intentionally flew below the weather hazard
after receiving warning. The court granted the FAA's mo-
tion for summary judgment as to the plaintiff's claim that
the FAA had breached its duty to provide accurate
weather information. 183
E. Pefection of a Security Interest
In South Shore Bank v. International Jet Interiors, Inc.,184
South Shore Bank extended a loan to LTD Industries,
Inc. (LTD) and obtained a security interest in a 1982 Gulf-
18, Fischer, 22 Av. Cas. at 17,179.
182 Id.
IN' Id.
111 721 F. Supp. 29 (E.D.N.Y. 1989).
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
stream American airplane. South Shore filed notice of its
security agreement with the FAA on June 19, 1988. On
June 20, 1988, LTD contracted with International Jet In-
teriors, Inc.(IJI) to refurbish the interior of the aircraft.
LTD subsequently defaulted on the loan from South
Shore, and South Shore repossessed the aircraft in New
Jersey. LTD also failed to pay IJI for its work and, in Sep-
tember, 1988, IJI attempted to file a mechanics' lien
against the aircraft. The FAA refused to record IJI's no-
tice, however, because the lien was not filed in New York,
the state where the work was stated to have been per-
formed. On November 18, 1988, IJI filed a second notice
of lien, stating that the work had been performed in New
Jersey and the FAA recorded the second lien notice on
December 8, 1988. Because the lien included the air-
craft's title, making sale to a third part impossible, South
Shore commenced an action for declaratory judgment to
determine the validity of IJI's lien.
The district court concluded that federal law pre-
empted IJI's mechanic's lien claim. It relied on Philko Avi-
ation, Inc. v. Schaket, 1 5 in which the United States Supreme
Court construed section 503(c) of the Federal Aviation
Act, 8 6 which provides that no instrument affecting the ti-
tle to any aircraft is valid against innocent third parties
until the instrument is filed for recordation with the FAA.
The Supreme Court further concluded that section 503(c)
pre-empted state laws that validated undocumented or
unrecorded transfers of aircraft. 8 7
IJI attempted to escape the Philko holding by claiming,
first, that South Shore had actual notice of IJI's lien. With
respect to IJI's first argument, the court held that Philko
had overruled any previous decisions regarding the effect
of state law on the validity of an unrecorded lien. The
court further held that as to IJI's second argument, South
Shore's Security interest attached to the aircraft at the
,85 462 U.S. 406 (1983).
,'8 49 U.S.C. app. § 1403 (1988).
'"7 Philko, 462 U.S. at 411-12.
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time notice of the interest was filed. Since IJI had not
filed its lien prior to that time, South Shore could not be
held to have had actual notice of IJI's claim. The court
found that a lien affecting an interest in an aircraft became
valid only when the lien was filed for recording with the
FAA. When more than one recorded lien has been filed,
the priority of those liens then should be determined by
reference to applicable state law. 88 The court ordered a
further hearing on South Shore's motion for summary
judgment to determine the order of priority of recorded
liens under New Jersey law.
F. Statutory Construction
In United States v. Rocky Mountain Helicopters, Inc. ,1a9 the
federal government brought an action against Rocky
Mountain Helicopters, Inc. (RMH) to recover civil penal-
ties for alleged violations of FAA regulations, requiring
RMH to provide crew members with eight hours rest
every twenty-four hour work period. The court found
that the defendant did not violate the applicable FAA reg-
ulation and denied the recovery of civil penalties.19°At is-
sue was the interpretation of two federal regulations
governing flight and duty time in effect at the time of the
alleged violations. The first regulation provided that no
certificate holder may designate a flight crew member,
and no flight crew member may accept an assignment, un-
less that assignment provided for at least ten consecutive
hours of rest during the twenty-four hour period preced-
ing the planned assignment completion.' 9' RMH had
been operating under an exemption to this regulation,
which permitted RHM to make an assignment providing
flight crew members with only eight consecutive hours of
rest. 92 This exemption formed the basis of a new regula-
188 South Shore Bank, 721 F. Supp. at 34.
089 704 F. Supp. 1046 (D. Utah 1989).
1o Id. at 1051.
1, 14 C.F.R. § 135.162(b) (1984) (repealed 1985).
192 14 C.F.R. § 135.271(c) (1990).
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tion, which was designed to replace the existing regula-
tion and its exception and was effective on October 1,
1985.
The government claimed that the new regulation was
merely a codification of the old regulation, as modified by
the exemption, and that RMH's flight records indicated a
violation of both regulations. RMH argued that its con-
duct during the time prior covered by the government's
complaint was governed by the old regulation, under
which certificate holders were only required to provide a
rest plan while the new regulation provided that flight
crew members must be relieved unless the crew member
would receive eight consecutive hours of rest. Under
RMH's interpretation of the regulation, flight records
showed that the pilots, not RMH, had violated the
regulation.
The court found that the new regulation was not en-
forceable against RMH until its compliance date, one year
after the regulation's effective date. Therefore, RMH's
conduct during the time of the alleged violation was gov-
erned by the old regulation. The court then addressed the
issue of the standard of conduct required by RMH under
the old regulation. The court found that the operative
term "provide" did not impose strict liability upon RMH
for any violation of the eight hour rest requirement. The
court construed the word "provide" to mean "furnish or
supply," rather than "require." The court noted that the
new regulation strengthened the language of the rest re-
quirement to read that flight crew members must be re-
lieved if they had not received their requisite rest. 93
In determining whether the defendant had violated the
standard of conduct under the old regulation, the court
examined the defendant's operations manual. The court
found that the defendant met the requirements of the reg-
ulation by making flight assignments providing for the re-
quired amount of rest. Any violation was contrary to the
,99 Rocky Mountain, 704 F. Supp. at 1050.
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defendant's operations manual and would, therefore, be
an independent act by the pilot, rather than a violation by
RMH. 194
XII. PASSENGER ACTIONS AGAINST AIR CARRIERS
A. Terrorist Attack
The case of Shinn v. El Al Israel Airlines ' 95 arose under
Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention which subjects an
airline carrier to absolute liability for damages sustained
in the event of a death, wounding, or any other bodily in-
juries suffered by a passenger while aboard or in the
course of embarking or disembarking an aircraft. The
plaintiffs sued the air carrier for injuries they sustained
during a terrorist attack while waiting to board an aircraft.
To determine whether the provisions of Article 17 ap-
plied to the plaintiffs' claims, the court analyzed whether
they were in the process of embarking or disembarking at
the time of the attack. In its determination, the court con-
sidered four factors: 1) the passengers' activities; 2) the
passengers' control; (3) the air carrier's control over the
passengers; and 4) the passengers' location. The court
found that the plaintiffs had obtained their boarding
passes and checked their baggage but were still free to
roam the airport at will. Noting that the aircraft had not
even arrived and that the plaintiffs were not in a sterile
area subject to the air carrier's control, the court granted
the air carrier's motion to dismiss. 196
B. Flights Delays and Missed Connections
In Padua v. Eastern Airlines, Inc. ,,9 the court held that the
defendant, Eastern Airlines, Inc. (Eastern), was not liable
under breach of contract for damages resulting from a de-
lay in the departure of the plaintiff's flight and subse-
'I ld. at 1050-51.
: 21 Av. Cas. (CCH) 18,331 (D. Colo. 1989).
,.n Id. at 18,334.
197 21 Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,716 (P.R. Super. Ct. 1988).
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quent missed connection. g" The court concluded that
the primary duty of an air carrier was to exercise the high-
est degree of care for the safety of its passengers. To im-
pose liability for a flight delay which may have been
caused by any number of factors related to safety, such as
mechanical problems or adverse weather conditions,
would be contrary to the air carrier's duty to the public.
The court found that the contractual provisions contained
in the tickets relating to the air carrier's liability under
such circumstances were valid and obligatory and not in
contravention of law, morals, or public order. As a matter
of law, the air carrier was not liable for contractual dam-
ages such as those claimed by the plaintiff.' 99
In Cenci v. Mall Airways, Inc. ,2oo the plaintiff sued to re-
cover damages after the air carrier issuing her original
ticket rerouted her to Delta Airlines, whose flight was
delayed due to adverse weather conditions, causing her to
miss her connecting flight. Instead of returning to the
Delta counter to obtain a new ticket on a later connecting
flight, the plaintiff purchased a ticket to her destination on
United Airlines. The plaintiff sought damages against the
original air carrier, Mall Airways, for cancellation of its
flight. The City Court of Albany held that, under its con-
tract for carriage, Mall was not liable for damages caused
by the cancellation.2 ' Mall's contract for carriage pro-
. vided that it reserved the right to cancel any flights and
assumed no responsibility for the effects of such action.
Mall was also not liable for damages under the Warsaw
Convention. Since Mall informed the plaintiff of its
flight's mechanical problems and provided her with an al-
ternative means of reaching her destination, Mall took
"all necessary measures to avoid the damage" to the
plaintiff.20 2 In addition, the court found no evidence that
' ld. at 17,717.
I' d. at 17,717-18.
2-o 140 Misc. 2d 907, 531 N.Y.S.2d 743 (Albany City Ct. 1988).
201 Id.; 531 N.Y.S.2d at 744.
202 Id.; 531 N.Y.S.2d at 745.
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Mall had an explicit arrangement with Delta, by which it
would assume any liability for Delta's share of the plain-
tiff's circumstances. Mall was relieved from any liability
caused by Delta's delay under the provisions of Article 30
of the Warsaw Convention.2 °3 The court, however,
awarded the plaintiff reimbursement for the unused por-
tion of her Mall Airways ticket.20 4
C. Miscellaneous
The case of In Re: Passenger Computer Reservations Systems
Antitrust Litigation,2 °5 arose out of the defendants' owner-
ship of computerized reservation systems (CRS). A CRS
is composed of computer terminals and printers in travel
agencies which are telephonically linked to the owner's
computer. The equipment allows the travel agent to send
and receive air transportation booking information, book
flights, and print out tickets. The subject CRS were
owned by various airlines, and each CRS contained flight
information for airlines other than the owner airline. The
CRS owner charged the travel agents for the use of the
system, and charged other airlines fees for booking air
transportation through the CRS.
Defendant American Airlines owned the world's largest
CRS, the SABRE system, which over 11,000 travel agen-
cies used to handle airline, hotel, and car reservations. At
the time of this litigation, SABRE was processing over ten-
million reservations per month.
Defendant United Airlines was the first company to an-
nounce plans to market a CRS. Their CRS, APPOLLO,
was the second largest in the world, with an estimated
market share of 23%, although United claimed to have a
39% market share at the time of this litigation. Ameri-
can's market share was approximately 30%, down from
40% in 1980. Eastern Airlines, TWA, and Delta shared
the rest of the market. A claim was brought against the
203 Id.
2- Id.; 531 N.Y.S.2d at 746.
2-5 694 F. Supp. 1443 (C.D. Cal. 1988).
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airlines for their refusal to provide competitors with rea-
sonable access to their respective CRS, allegedly in an at-
tempt to monopolize the market for air transportation.
The district court held that United's refusal to accom-
modate its competitors did not constitute an attempted
monopolization of the air transportation market.20 6 The
court found that the airlines' supercompetitive booking
fees and contract provisions, which made it difficult for
travel agents to switch systems, did not establish signifi-
cant entry barriers into the market. The court also found
that there were alternative systems available to the com-
petitors. Claims that a 12% to 14% market share con-
ferred monopoly power were unfounded due to the
number of competitors. 0 7
Due to the inability to determine relevant market and
monopoly power issues, the court did not dismiss the mo-
nopolization claims on summary judgment motions. Fac-
tual questions remained as to whether the relevant market
comprised the nationwide market for access to the air-
lines' respective CRS by travel agents or the nationwide
market for access to all CRS automated travel agents. It
was not possible to assess monopoly power without a find-
ing of a relative market.
In JM Partners/Omni Aviation v. Group Investments, Inc. 2 o8
the plaintiffs negotiated to lease two aircraft to the de-
fendant. Following execution of the leases, the plaintiffs
purchased the aircraft and had them inspected, at which
time both were found to be airworthy and in good repair.
Subsequently, the defendant's employees inspected both
aircraft. The defendant then informed the plaintiffs that it
was dissatisfied with both aircraft and considered the
leases null and void pursuant to the satisfaction clauses.
The trial court found that the defendant acted unrea-
sonably and arbitrarily and, therefore, was in breach of
the leases. The defendant's dissatisfaction "resulted from
2-i Id. at 1454.
207 Id.
20s 21 Av. Cas. (CCH) 18,044 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1988).
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some factors other than the proper mechanical condition
or airworthiness of the planes. ' 20 9 The court determined
that the defendant did not have an "unfettered right" to
determine whether it was satisfied with the aircraft, even
though the satisfaction clauses provided that the leases'
terms would not commence until the defendant was com-
pletely satisfied with the equipment's condition.
On appeal, the Tennessee Court of Appeals found that
the evidence supported the trial court's finding that "it
was the intention of the parties that both airplanes be air-
worthy and be delivered to the defendant in proper
mechanical condition. ' 21 0 The court also held that even
under an objective standard, the clauses did not allow the
defendant to act arbitrarily or capriciously. The court
found that the facts showed that both aircraft were airwor-
thy. The court concluded that any rejection had to be rea-
sonable and based on the mechanical condition of the
aircraft.2 l
XIII. CONTRACTUAL CLAIMS
A. Breach of Contract
In United States Gold Corp. v. Federal Express Corp. ,212 Fed-
eral Express' contract of carriage and service guides lim-
ited its liability to $100.00 for loss of and failure to deliver
a package containing gold grain valued at $102,042.41.
The Federal Express Manifest contained an agreement
between Federal Express and U.S. Gold, regarding the
shipment. The Manifest included, by reference, the then
current Federal Express Service Guide. The front of the
Manifest contained the following provision: "By signing,
shipper acknowledges and accepts the terms and condi-
tions of shipment and agrees to be bound thereby. '2 13 An
209 Id. at 18,046.
210 Id.
211 Id. at 18,045.
212 22 Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,350 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
213 Id. at 17,351.
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agent prepared and signed the Manifest on behalf of U.S.
Gold.
The Manifest further provided a liability limitation of
$100.00 per shipment unless the shipper declared a
higher value in a space provided on the Manifest. Plaintiff
declared no value in addition to the $100.00 per ship-
ment. The shipper's copy of the Manifest contained a re-
statement of the liability limitation and the declared value.
U.S. Gold contended that the Manifest was a mere "re-
ceipt," and that it did not embody the contract of car-
riage. The district court found no basis for U.S. Gold's
argument and held that the limitation of liability was valid
and enforceable as a matter of law because it resulted
from a "fair, open, just, and reasonable agreement be-
tween the carrier and shipper, [and the shipper was given]
the option of higher recovery upon paying a higher
rate. '2 1 4 Federal Express' motion for partial summary
judgment was granted, and its liability, if any, was limited
to $100.00.215
In Dopf v. United Airlines, Inc.,216 United cancelled the
plaintiff's flight after the aircraft experienced a fueling
problem. The plaintiff alleged that he received multiple
assurances from the codefendant Lundell, a United cus-
tomer service supervisor, that he would personally guar-
antee that the plaintiff's baggage would be put on the
plaintiff's alternate flight. When the plaintiff arrived in
Denver, he was unable to locate his luggage, which con-
tained his overcoat and prescription medicine. Plaintiff
also alleged that he missed his connecting flight, requir-
ing him to spend the night in Denver.
Although United made accommodations for his over-
night stay, the plaintiff alleged that the hotel van stopped
outside the terminal building, and he had to stand in sub-
freezing temperatures in the snow. Furthermore, upon
arrival at his hotel room, the temperature was forty-five
214 Id. at 17,355-56.
"1- Id. at 17,358.
26 21 Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,835 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1988).
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degrees. The plaintiff claimed these conditions aggra-
vated his illness. The plaintiff further alleged that the
next morning he was unable to locate his luggage, follow-
ing conversations with United and his connecting airline.
Subsequently, the plaintiff decided to abandon his trip
and return home. Later, United found the plaintiff's lug-
gage in Goodland, Kansas and returned it to him
undamaged.
The New York Supreme Court granted a summary
judgment motion in favor of United. The Court held that
the airline's tariff contained exculpatory clauses for cer-
tain classes of freight and limitations of liability for loss or
damage to specified property, and the clauses were valid
regardless of fault.21 7 The applicable tariff excused the
airline from liability for failure to operate any flight ac-
cording to schedule or for changing the schedule. The
court determined that United had complied with its tariff
provisions, since it offered to transport the plaintiff on the
next flight on which space was available at no additional
cost. The court found no merit in the plaintiff's conten-
tion that the tariff provisions were inapplicable because
the plaintiff did not receive the requisite notice of their
terms. The court held instead, that a passenger on an in-
terstate flight was conclusively deemed to have had notice
of the contents of the transportation documents.21 8
In addition, the court found no special contract be-
tween the plaintiff and United's customer service supervi-
sor, since the airline's tariff provided that no employee of
the airline had the authority to alter, modify, or waive any
of the tariff's provisions unless authorized by a corporate
officer. 2'9 The customer service supervisor was not per-
sonally liable to the plaintiff for any damages suffered as a
result of the delay in the delivery of his baggage, since he
was performing his employer's work.
2 7 Id. at 17,837.
219 Id. at 17,837-38.
2 19 Id. at 17,838.
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B. Lack of Privity
The action in Fourquin v. People Express Airlines, Inc. 220 in-
volved the loss of three pieces of artwork. The plaintiffs
sued to recover the value of the artwork appraised at
$150,000.00, plus lost profit, estimated at $100,000.00.
At the People's Express luggage check-in counter, one of
the plaintiffs (Fourquin) allegedly advised an agent that
one of his three bags contained the artwork, and he de-
manded that the bag receive special treatment. The agent
agreed and all three bags were checked.
Upon Fourquin's arrival in England, he discovered that
of the three bags he checked, the bag containing the art-
work was missing. He reported the loss, and People Ex-
press subsequently paid him $910,000.00.221 No
stipulations or releases were exchanged and/or executed.
People Express never recovered Fourquin's luggage.
An individual, who had not purchased a ticket from
People Express filed a joinder motion as a party plaintiff,
claiming a one-half interest in one of the artworks. The
individual contended that, since commencing the action,
Fourquin had disappeared. The individual maintained
that denial of the motion would prejudice his interest.
The New York Supreme Court held that an individual
who did not purchase a ticket from an airline was not enti-
tled to be added as a, party plaintiff, even if he claimed an
interest in the plaintiffs' loss. The court followed the well-
settled principle that the purchase of an airline ticket cre-
ates a contract only between the purchaser and the pro-
vider of the service. Since no privity was found between
the individual and the airline, the court found no basis for
his joinder.222
22o 21 Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,942 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1989).
2' Id. The court did not explain why the plaintiffs recoverd $660,000.00 more
than their estimated losses.
222 Id. at 17,943.
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XIV. HANDICAPPED PASSENGERS
A. Duty of Care Required by the Carrier
In Ax v. Delta Airlines, Inc. ,223 a handicapped passenger,
suffering from a severe form of arthritis and osteoporosis,
sued Delta Airlines, seeking damages for personal injuries
when a flight attendant lifted her from her seat. The
plaintiff had given the flight attendant a letter from her
doctor which described her disease and stated that she
would require a bulkhead seat during the flight. She was
assigned a bulkhead seat to her destination, but on her
return flight, a bulkhead seat was not available. Delta
placed the plaintiff in a priority position in case an as-
signed bulkhead seat became available and also tried to
have persons sitting in the bulkhead seats change places
with the plaintiff. Unable to acquire a bulkhead seat, the
plaintiff sat in the seat assigned to her. When the flight
arrived at its destination, the flight attendant told the
plaintiff to remain seated until all of the passengers de-
planed. The attendant then lifted the plaintiff from her
seat. At that time, the plaintiff claimed she felt a snap in
her back and knocked her ankle against the bar of the seat
in front.
The plaintiff's doctor testified that bumping or touch-
ing the plaintiff could result in injury. Although the flight
attendant knew that the plaintiff needed bulkhead seating,
she was never aware of the plaintiff's predilection for inju-
ries which could result from lifting her from her seat.
The district court held that Delta's employees did not
know or have reason to know of the plaintiff's disability.
The court further stated that although airlines must try to
accommodate handicapped passengers, if they cannot sat-
isfy a demand on a particular flight, the traveller would
have to choose whether to remain on the scheduled flight
or wait for one on which the passenger's medical disability
could be accommodated. The court held that the plaintiff
failed to carry her burden of proof in establishing the air-
'- 21 Av. Cas. (CCH) 18,474 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
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line's liability for breach of duty to exercise such care and
to render such aid for her safety and welfare as would be
reasonably required by her disability. Consequently, the
plaintiff's complaint was dismissed. 24
B. Refusal to Board
In Tallarico v. Trans World Airlines, Inc. ,225 a thirteen year
old child with cerebral palsy who could not walk or talk
but had normal intelligence and could communicate with
trained persons was entitled to maintain an action against
Trans World Airlines (TWA) for its refusal to allow her to
fly unaccompanied. The plaintiff, the child's father, made
reservations on TWA's flight for his daughter to fly home
from her school for the Thanksgiving holiday. The child
arrived at Houston's Hobby Airport in a wheelchair with a
hired limousine driver who informed the TWA ticket
agent that she would be flying alone. The agent and his
manager decided that the child could not travel unaccom-
panied and refused to allow her to board the flight.
The plaintiff was required to travel to Houston to ac-
company his daughter to St. Louis. At the end of the
Thanksgiving weekend, the plaintiff traveled back to
Houston with his daughter and then returned to St. Louis.
The plaintiff alleged expenditures of $1,350.00 in out-of-
pocket expenses for two round-trip flights from St. Louis
to Houston, plus incidental costs. He alleged, among
other things, that TWA violated the Air Carrier Access Act
of 1986 in its refusal to allow the child to travel alone. 6
The trial court held that the plaintiff did not have an im-
plied, private cause of action under the Air Carrier Access
Act.
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit concluded that although
the Air Carrier Act did not expressly grant private citizens
224 Id. at 18,475.
'22. 881 F.2d 566 (8th Cir. 1989).
226 49 U.S.C. app. § 1374(c)(1) (1988). "No air carrier may discriminate against
any otherwise qualified handicapped individual, by reason of such handicap, in the
provision of air transportation." 49 U.S.C. app. § 1374(c)(1).
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a cause of action to remedy perceived air carrier viola-
tions, an implied, private cause of action existed under
the Act because the child was one for whose special bene-
fit the statute was enacted. In reaching its conclusion, the
court looked to the United States Supreme Court decision
Cort v. Ash,227 which provided an analytical framework for
determining whether the child did, in fact, have such an
implied private cause of action. In Cort, the Supreme
Court examined four factors it considered relevant in ana-
lyzing a statute for an implied right of action. First, the
Court looked at whether the plaintiff was one of the class
for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted. Sec-
ond, the Court considered whether there was any con-
gressional intent, explicit or implicit, either to create or
deny such a remedy. Third, the Court asked whether the
remedy was consistent with the underlying purpose of the
legislative scheme to create an implied private right. Fi-
nally, the Court considered whether the cause of action
was one traditionally delegated to state law such that it
would be inappropriate to infer a cause of action based
solely on federal law.228
In applying the Cort factors to the facts in Tallarico, the
Eighth Circuit determined that the minor, as a handi-
capped individual, was a member of the class of persons
for whose special benefit Congress enacted the Air Car-
rier Access Act. The court believed that the circum-
stances surrounding the enactment of the Act provided an
implicit indication that Congress did intend to create a
private cause of action for handicapped individuals who
were injured when air carriers discriminated against them.
In implying a remedy to handicapped persons for appar-
ent violations of the Act, the court did not perceive any
inconsistency with the underlying purposes of the legisla-
tive scheme. Finally, the court found that air carrier dis-
crimination against handicapped persons was not an area
of law which was basically the states' concern. The court
227 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
'2 Id. at 78.
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concluded that the minor stated a claim under the Air
Carrier Access Act because she had an implied private
cause of action under the Act.229
In Andrews v. Piedmont Airlines,230 an action for inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress, false imprisonment,
and negligence, based on an airline's refusal to permit a
passenger to board its aircraft and travel unaccompanied
due to his physical incapacity was not sustainable. The
trial court granted the airline's motion for summary judg-
ment, and the plaintiff appealed. The South Carolina
Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision.
The plaintiff's daughter in Florida agreed to let him live
in her home, and the hospital at which he had been a pa-
tient arranged the trip. Piedmont informed the hospital's
social worker when she made the arrangements that the
airline had guidelines governing handicapped passengers
traveling unaccompanied. The hospital transported the
plaintiff to the airport where he was placed in an airport
wheelchair and taken to the Piedmont ticket counter. He
purchased a ticket and was wheeled to the gate area. The
Piedmont station manager subsequently questioned the
plaintiff about his physical condition and concluded that
he did not meet the airline's disabled passenger
guidelines.
The plaintiff claimed that Piedmont's negligent conduct
caused him to suffer damages in the form of expenditures
for lodging at the hospital and emotional discomfort to
him and his family. The court rejected these arguments.
The court found that the costs for lodging were not proxi-
mately caused by Piedmont's conduct. 231 As to the claim
for emotional damages, the court concluded that "[m]ere
emotional discomfort [was] not an actionable damage,
even if it [resulted] from the defendant's lack of due
care."
232
22i Tallarico, 881 F.2d at 570.
2- 297 S.C. 367, 377 S.E.2d 127 (Ct. App. 1989).
2.1 Id. at 369, 377 S.E.2d at 129.
2 2 Id.
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In addition, the court held that the airline's actions
were not so extreme and outrageous as to support a cause
of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress,
nor did the airline's actions support a cause of action for
false imprisonment since there was no evidence that the
restraint was unlawful.233 The court reasoned that it was
well established that common carriers had a higher duty
toward noticeably handicapped passengers, and, in light
of the plaintiff's condition, the alleged restraint was rea-
sonable. The court concluded that it may have been a
breach of the airline's duty if it had not detained the plain-
tiff until the hospital's social worker arrived.234
XV. MISCELLANEOUS
A. Constitutional Challenge
In International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v.
Lee,235 the plaintiffs commenced an action challenging the
policy of the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey
prohibiting the continuous distribution of literature to,
and solicitation of contributions from, individuals in the
public areas of the passenger terminals at Port Authority
controlled airports. The plaintiffs contended that the
prohibition of these activities within the public areas of
the airports violated their constitutional rights under the
First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States
Constitution.
In challenging the airport regulations prohibiting the
distribution of literature and solicitation of contributions,
the district court held that only access to the interior of
airport terminals was relevant because the plaintiffs had
consistently limited their demand for access to the inte-
rior of the buildings and had never sought access to the
airport's exterior sidewalks. In reaching its decision, the
court relied, on Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educa-
"2. Id
.. 4 Id. at 370, 377 S.E.2d at 130.
2- 721 F. Supp. 572 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
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tion Fund,23 6 in which the United States Supreme Court
stated that when defining the relevant forum, a court
should focus on the access sought by the speaker.
The district court held that the airport terminals were
traditional public forums and, therefore, the government
could not impose content-based restrictions on First
Amendment activity unless those restrictions were nar-
rowly tailored to further a compelling state interest. The
government could impose, in those forums, content-neu-
tral time, place, and manner restrictions, provided such
restrictions served significant governmental interest and
left adequate alternative channels of communication. The
court concluded that airports were comparable to city
streets, which made them fit well within the notion of
traditional public forums.23 7 Since the Port Authority's
blanket prohibition on leafletting and solicitation was not
narrowly tailored to further a compelling state interest the
court granted the plaintiffs' motion for summary
judgment. 38
B. Hazardous Materials Aboard Aircraft
In United States v. Moskowitz, 2 39 the defendant appealed a
conviction for knowingly and recklessly causing the trans-
portation in air commerce of hazardous materials 240 and
of willfully violating federal regulations by transporting
hazardous materials in air commerce. 24 1
The evidence showed that the defendant and four com-
panions possessed cocaine and various drug parapherna-
2 473 U.S. 788 (1985).
2.17 Lee, 721 F. Supp. at 576-77.
2-18 Id. at 579.
239 888 F.2d 223 (2d Cir. 1989).
240 See 49 U.S.C. app. § 1472(h)(2) (1988). "A person is guilty of an offense if
he ... recklessly causes the transportation in air commerce of ... property which
contains a hazardous material ..... 49 U.S.C. app. § 1472(h)(2). See also 18
U.S.C. § 2 (1988).
241 See 49 U.S.C. app. § 1809(a)(1) (1988) (civil penalties for transporting haz-
ardous materials); 49 U.S.C. app. § 1809(b) (criminal penalties for transporting
hazardous materials); 18 U.S.C. § 2.
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lia, including several canisters of butane and nitrous
oxide, while on board an Eastern Airline flight.
The defendant argued that the government had failed
to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he either knew
or was aware of the FAA regulations prohibiting the trans-
portation of hazardous materials, or was aware of reck-
lessly or willfully violating such regulations. The court
concluded that the defendant had sufficient notice that
the types of hazardous materials brought on board the
aircraft were prohibited. Testimony at trial indicated that
notices advising passengers of federal law prohibiting
transportation of hazardous materials were posted at the
entrance to the Eastern Airlines terminal at John F. Ken-
nedy International Airport, at the ticket counter, and at
the defendant's gate. The notices indicated that "hazard-
ous materials" included explosives, compressed gases,
flammable liquids, and flammable solids. The court held
that a reasonable jury could conclude that the defendant's
behavior revealed an awareness that the canisters of bu-
tane were prohibited and needed to be concealed from
the airport authorities. 4 2
242 Moskowitz, 888 F.2d at 228.
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